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AMENDMENT CREEP
Jonathan L. Marshfield*
To most lawyers and judges, constitutional amendment rules are nothing more
than the technical guidelines for changing a constitution’s text. But amendment rules contain a great deal of substance that can be relevant to deciding
myriad constitutional issues. Indeed, judges have explicitly drawn on amendment rules when deciding issues as far afield as immigration, criminal procedure, free speech, and education policy. The Supreme Court, for example, has
reasoned that, because Article V of the U.S. Constitution places no substantive
limitations on formal amendment, the First Amendment must protect even
the most revolutionary political viewpoints. At the state level, courts have cited
flexible amendment rules in state constitutions to support judicial restraint.
Although largely unnoticed by scholars, amendment rules may be creeping
into other areas of constitutional law.
This Article provides the first systematic investigation and assessment of
“amendment creep”—the phenomenon where judges explicitly draw on
amendment rules to interpret constitutional provisions unrelated to formal
amendment. The Article concludes that federal and state amendment rules
contain constitutional substance that can assist judges and lawyers in resolving
many diverse constitutional disputes. Based on an extensive review of relevant
Supreme Court and state high court opinions, the Article constructs a typology
of amendment-based arguments. The Article concludes that amendment creep
is an extension of a familiar form of constitutional reasoning known as structuralism, and that it may have several normative benefits for constitutional
adjudication—such as promoting overall constitutional coherence and ensuring that judges give appropriate consideration to the democratic values that
amendment rules embed in the constitutional framework.
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Introduction
There is an underappreciated source of constitutional meaning creeping
into U.S. constitutional law. In Justice Scalia’s recent dissent in Obergefell v.
Hodges, he suggested that the Court wrongly interpreted the Fourteenth
Amendment to guarantee same-sex couples the right to marry because the
majority’s interpretation was so revolutionary that it effectively rendered
meaningless Article V’s procedures for formal amendment.1 Although perfunctory, Justice Scalia’s reliance on Article V to support his interpretation
1. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2628 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia argued in dissent that the majority opinion was a “threat to American democracy.” Id.
at 2626. He agreed with the majority’s conclusion that “[t]he generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the extent of
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of the Fourteenth Amendment illustrates a broader interpretive phenomenon whereby judges explicitly draw on formal amendment rules to shed
light on the meaning of other constitutional provisions.2 Indeed, judges of
all interpretive persuasions have cited Article V and state amendment rules
when addressing issues as wide-ranging as immigration,3 criminal procedure,4 free speech,5 and education policy.6 Contrary to conventional
freedom in all of its dimensions.” Id. at 2628 (quoting the majority opinion). He argued,
however, that this was precisely why the founding generation included procedures for formal
amendment of the Constitution in Article V. Id. According to Justice Scalia, the existence of
formal amendment procedures is evidence that the Constitution does not authorize the Court
to make significant changes in constitutional law through judicial interpretation of the text. Id.
at 2628–29. Justice Scalia inferred from Article V that significant changes to individual rights
protections should occur through either formal constitutional amendment or nonconstitutional legislation—but not through judicial review. See id. at 2628 (stating that explicit
changes in individual rights should occur through formal constitutional amendment or “the
never-ending process of legislation”). For an overview of the reasoning and opinions in
Obergefell, see generally Donald H. J. Hermann, Extending the Fundamental Right of Marriage
to Same-Sex Couples: The United States Supreme Court Decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, 49
Ind. L. Rev. 367 (2016).
2. My focus in this Article is not whether the substance of amendments to a constitution affects how courts interpret other constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson,
Holistic Interpretation: Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and Our Bifurcated Constitution, 53 Stan. L. Rev.
1259 (2001) (arguing that the Reconstruction Amendments to the federal Constitution should
inform how judges interpret pre–Civil War provisions of the Constitution). My focus is
whether the “procedural” provisions in a constitution that explain how the text can be
amended may inform judicial interpretation of other constitutional provisions. For examples
of this interpretative technique, see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 205 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (relying on Article V to interpret Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment implementation authority); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957) (plurality
opinion) (citing Article V as support for the interpretation of the supremacy clause in Article
VI); and Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 538 F.3d 355, 363 (5th Cir. 2008) (dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc) (relying on Article V to assess a substantive due process claim
under the Fourteenth Amendment).
3. E.g., Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 121 n.2, 137–38 (1943) (relying
heavily on Article V to evaluate whether a petitioner for naturalization met the statutory requirement of showing that he “behaved as a man . . . attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States”).
4. E.g., Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 75 (1970) (Black, J., concurring) (citing
Article V as support for an interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial); Minnesota v. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d 379, 382–83 (Minn. 1988) (relying on state constitutional amendment rules when interpreting a state constitutional guarantee to a twelve-person jury),
superseded by constitutional amendment as stated in Danforth v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493 (Minn.
2009); State v. Samora, 307 P.3d 328, 331–32 (N.M. 2013) (relying on New Mexico’s amendment procedures in deciding whether jurors had a constitutional right to a Spanish translator).
5. E.g., Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 57 (1967) (relying on Article V to interpret the
First Amendment).
6. E.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 863 So. 2d 73, 90 (Ala. 2003) (Moore, C.J., concurring in
the result) (relying on state amendment procedures to decide a case regarding an educationfunding scheme); Sherman v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 744 S.E.2d 26, 32–33 (Ga. 2013) (relying on the state constitutional process of amendment to interpret a provision of the state
constitution regulating public education financing).
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thought,7 these cases suggest that amendment rules do much more than provide the technical guidelines for formal amendment. Amendment rules, it
seems, are creeping into judicial interpretations of other areas of constitutional law.
Surprisingly, this technique of using amendment rules to help interpret
substantive constitutional provisions has gone largely unnoticed and, as a
result, is vastly understudied.8 To be sure, much has been written about the
relationship between formal and informal methods of constitutional
change,9 but until now no one has undertaken a systemic study of how U.S.
judges explicitly draw on a constitution’s formal amendment rules when
interpreting other constitutional provisions, or whether this interpretative
methodology is normatively desirable.10 This Article addresses that void by
providing the first description and assessment of what I call “amendment
creep.”
Consider two examples: one from the United States Supreme Court, and
one from state constitutional law. In Whitehill v. Elkins, the Supreme Court
considered whether Maryland violated the First Amendment by requiring
teachers at the University of Maryland to certify that they were not members
of a “subversive” group advocating “alteration of[ ] the constitutional form

7. E.g., Rosalind Dixon & Richard Holden, Constitutional Amendment Rules: The Denominator Problem, in Comparative Constitutional Design 195, 195 (Tom Ginsburg ed.,
2012) (describing the most immediate function of amendment rules as establishing democratic procedures for changing constitutional text); see also Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368,
374–76 (1921) (interpreting Article V’s procedural requirements for amendment).
8. Scholars have noted possible relationships between constitutional interpretation and
constitutional amendment. E.g., William F. Harris II, The Interpretable Constitution
164–68 (1993). This scholarship, however, focuses mostly on formal amendment as support
for the idea that textualism or originalism is the preferred approach to constitutional interpretation. E.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good
Constitution 81–99 (2013). My project here is much broader. I investigate how courts have
used amendment rules to interpret other portions of a constitution regardless of interpretative
philosophy. I am interested in the empirical phenomenon of “amendment creep,” not whether
amendment rules tend to support any particular interpretive philosophy.
9. E.g., 2 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations 15–27 (1998) (arguing that constitutional change can occur through “constitutional moments” of institutional
conflict without any formal change to constitutional text); Donald S. Lutz, Principles of
Constitutional Design 178–79 (2006) (empirically investigating the relationship between
formal and informal amendment); Heather K. Gerken, The Hydraulics of Constitutional Reform: A Skeptical Response to Our Undemocratic Constitution, 55 Drake L. Rev. 925, 926–27
(2007) (discussing the complex relationship between formal constitutional amendment and
informal amendment through judicial interpretation); Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutionalism
in the United States: From Theory to Politics, in Responding to Imperfection 37, 54 (Sanford
Levinson ed., 1995) (explaining that binding constitutional rules can be changed informally);
Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Colum. L.
Rev. 606, 616–18 (2008).
10. But cf. Richard Albert, The Expressive Function of Constitutional Amendment Rules, 59
McGill L.J. 225, 265–80 (2013) (describing how the German Constitutional Court has drawn
on Germany’s formal amendment rules in deciding certain constitutional cases).
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of government of the United States, or of the State of Maryland.”11 In holding that the oath was unconstitutional, the Court reasoned that the Constitution implicitly forbids the government from discriminating against people
who “might wish to [peacefully] ‘alter’ our form of government” because
the Constitution itself outlines a procedure whereby any conceivable changes
can be made to the Constitution.12 In other words, the Court inferred that
the Constitution protects freedom of expression regarding radical political
change because Article V places “no restraint” whatsoever on the kind of
constitutional amendments that are permissible.13
In Maso v. State Taxation and Revenue Department, Motor Vehicle Division, a Spanish-speaking man living in New Mexico lost his driving privileges because he failed to respond timely to a written notice that was in
English.14 He appealed, arguing that the English-only notice violated his due
process rights under the New Mexico Constitution.15 The New Mexico Supreme Court held that an English-only notification satisfied the federal Constitution.16 The Court noted, however, that New Mexico’s due process clause
can provide broader protections if the party claiming those protections can
“provide reasons for interpreting the state provision differently from the
federal provision.”17 As it turns out, New Mexico’s amendment rules are
unique in that they require all proposed constitutional amendments to be
published in both Spanish and English.18 They also establish more difficult
amendment procedures for any proposed amendments affecting other protections for Spanish-speaking residents.19 In Maso, these provisions clearly
11. 389 U.S. 54, 55–57 (1967) (emphasis omitted) (holding that the complex statutory
scheme underlying the oath must be evaluated as a whole); see also Whitehill v. Elkins, 258 F.
Supp. 589, 592 (D. Md. 1966) (clearly stating the constitutional challenges raised by the plaintiff), rev’d, 389 U.S. 54 (1967).
12. Whitehill, 389 U.S. at 57.
13. See id. (“For the Constitution prescribes the method of ‘alteration’ by the amending
process in Article V; and while the procedure for amending it is restricted, there is no restraint
on the kind of amendment that may be offered.” (emphasis added)).
14. 96 P.3d 286, 287–88 (N.M. 2004).
15. Maso, 96 P.3d at 288.
16. Id. at 289–90.
17. Id. at 288 (quoting State v. Gomez, 932 P.2d 1, ¶ 23 (N.M. 1997)).
18. N.M. Const. art. XIX, § 1 (stating that the secretary of state “shall . . . provide notice
of the content and purpose of legislatively approved constitutional amendments in both English and Spanish to inform electors about the amendments in the time and manner provided
by law”).
19. Id. (establishing higher thresholds for amendments that would affect the rights of
Spanish-speaking residents to serve on juries and the constitutional requirement that public
school teachers learn Spanish). The New Mexico Constitution is the only state constitution
that explicitly insulates Spanish-language provisions from ordinary amendment procedures.
See infra note 278 (listing all subject-matter restrictions on formal amendment in current state
constitutions). Eight state constitutions, however, place subject-matter restrictions or limitations on formal amendment regarding a variety of issues, such as freedom of religion (e.g.,
Massachusetts) and any changes to the state bill of rights (e.g., Mississippi). See infra text
accompanying notes 275–276.
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supported an argument that New Mexico has a unique constitutional commitment to protecting its Spanish-speaking residents.20
Whitehill and Maso illustrate how amendment rules can shed light on
constitutional meaning. But they are just the tip of the amendment-creep
iceberg. Indeed, amendment rules can assist judges in resolving many other
constitutional disputes. Because amendment rules express how a nation or
state aspires to modify and maintain its fundamental law, they can provide a
window into the “broad norms and basic commitments” underlying the
constitutional text.21 As such, they are a particularly valuable source of constitutional meaning on a variety of constitutional issues.22 It is not surprising, therefore, that judges have looked to amendment rules to clarify
ambiguous constitutional provisions or answer questions that the text does
not explicitly address.
In this Article, I argue that using amendment rules to interpret other
constitutional provisions is consistent with a familiar form of constitutional
argumentation known as structuralism. Pursuant to the structural method,
judges ascertain constitutional meaning by drawing inferences from a constitution’s overall structure and the relationships between institutions created by the constitution.23 The structural method plays a significant role in
20. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that Mr. Maso was procedurally barred from
arguing that the New Mexico Constitution should be interpreted differently than the federal
Constitution because he did not raise that issue below and because the only support he offered
was disputed demographic data. Maso, 96 P.3d at 288–89. However, in a later case, the New
Mexico Supreme Court acknowledged that New Mexico’s amendment rules evince New Mexico’s unique commitment to equality for Spanish-speaking residents. See State v. Samora, 307
P.3d 328, 331 (N.M. 2013) (noting that the right of Spanish-speaking residents to serve on
juries is unique and “enshrined in our state Constitution as one of the few provisions that can
be amended only by a supermajority of both legislators and voters”). Based on the ruling in
Samora, it seems quite likely that the New Mexico Supreme Court would have entertained the
argument that New Mexico’s amendment rules demonstrate a unique state commitment to
Spanish-speaking residents that is not paralleled in the federal Constitution. Maso illustrates
just how important it can be for lawyers and judges to consult amendment rules when involved in constitutional adjudication.
21. See Stephen Holmes & Cass R. Sunstein, The Politics of Constitutional Revision in
Eastern Europe, in Responding to Imperfection, supra note 9, at 275, 276–80 (explaining
that, because amendment rules frame the power to change fundamental law, they “can help us
answer some old and fundamental questions”).
22. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment
Outside Article V, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 457, 461 (1994) (describing amendment rules as having
“unsurpassed importance” because they “define the conditions under which all other constitutional norms may be legally displaced”); Holmes & Sunstein, supra note 21, at 276–78 (noting
that amendment rules can reveal information about how society resolves fundamental issues,
such as the proper balance between majoritarian preferences and minority protections and
overall constitutional legitimacy).
23. The structural method was most famously described by Charles L. Black, Jr., in his
book Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law (1969). See Michael C. Dorf,
Interpretive Holism and the Structural Method, or How Charles Black Might Have Thought About
Campaign Finance Reform and Congressional Timidity, 92 Geo. L.J. 833, 834–35 (2004)
(describing the structural method).
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many constitutional cases.24 It was the cornerstone of Chief Justice Marshall’s argument in McCulloch v. Maryland for why Maryland could not tax
the federal Bank of the United States.25 It was also crucial to Chief Justice
Roberts’s recent opinion holding that the Affordable Care Act’s individual
mandate exceeded Congress’s authority under the Necessary and Proper
Clause.26 In each instance, the Court drew on familiar (but broad) structural
concepts, such as federalism, democracy, and the separation of powers, to
resolve disputes regarding constitutional meaning.27
Amendment creep follows in this same tradition of structural interpretation. When examined through the lens of structural argument, amendment rules often support compelling institutional and substantive
inferences. For example, amendment rules that single out certain subjects
for more arduous amendment procedures might indicate a “hierarchy” of
constitutional values, which can help judges resolve conflicts between competing constitutional norms.28 Article V, for instance, makes equal suffrage
in the Senate effectively impossible to change through formal amendment.29
24. See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution 74–92
(1982) (describing structuralism and providing a summary of various important Supreme
Court opinions that have used structural analysis).
25. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 428–29 (1819) (making the
famous structural argument that the power to tax must be coextensive with representation,
which therefore prohibits state taxation on federal agencies); see also Sotirios A. Barber &
James E. Fleming, Constitutional Interpretation: The Basic Questions 121–23 (2007)
(describing the structural arguments in McCulloch).
26. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586–89 (2012)
(opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (using a structural argument to decide the application of the necessary and proper clause); see also John F. Manning, The Supreme Court, 2013 Term—Foreword:
The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 39–42 (2014) (describing the structural argument in NFIB).
27. See Manning, supra note 26, at 42 (describing the structural arguments in both McCulloch and NFIB).
28. See Albert, supra note 10, at 244–47 (discussing how formal amendment rules can
suggest a hierarchy of constitutional values). Amendment rules in national constitutions
around the world are often structured around subject-matter triggers (or restrictions) that can
suggest a very clear hierarchy of constitutional values. See id. at 247–48 (discussing subjectmatter triggers and restrictions in the constitutions of Canada, South Africa, Ghana, Nigeria,
India, Cuba, Afghanistan, Brazil, Ukraine, Cameroon, and Portugal). Obviously, subject-specific amendment rules do not always indicate a hierarchy of constitutional values. See Richard
Albert, The Unamendable Core of the United States Constitution, in Comparative Perspectives on the Fundamental Freedom of Expression 13, 25–27 (Andras Koltay ed., 2015).
They can, for example, reflect bargain formation. Id. at 15–16; see infra Section II.A (discussing these issues further). Nevertheless, amendment creep appears to be an international phenomenon. See Albert, supra note 10, at 269–80 (describing the German Constitutional Court’s
use of amendment rules in resolving various constitutional cases unrelated to amendment
procedure).
29. See U.S. Const. art. V (allowing amendments, “[p]rovided that . . . no State, without
its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate”); see also Lynn A. Baker,
Federalism: The Argument from Article V, 13 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 923, 947–49 (1996) (demonstrating empirically that smaller states benefit from equal representation in the Senate and are
therefore unlikely to ever approve amendments depriving them of that benefit).
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This deep entrenchment of equal state representation suggests that the Constitution’s core includes strong federalism principles that cannot be completely displaced by a national popular movement.30
State constitutions are far more colorful than the federal Constitution in
this regard. Several state constitutions identify certain subjects that are either
unamendable or subject to more arduous or deliberative amendment
processes.31 Massachusetts, for example, prohibits any amendment by initiative “that relates to religion, religious practices or religious institutions.”32
Although overlooked by many lawyers and judges, these state-specific
amendment rules can provide a particularly valuable window into a state’s
constitutional priorities and the raw material for compelling structural arguments regarding constitutional meaning.
In addition to suggesting particular constitutional priorities, amendment rules can also help resolve institutional disputes between different
levels and branches of government.33 For example, several Supreme Court
justices have used Article V to construct institutional arguments in favor of
judicial restraint.34 The basic logic of the argument is that the Constitution
identifies Article V as the preferred process for constitutional change, and
30. See Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 121, 146 (1996) (explaining that this understanding of
Article V is historically accurate, because Article V’s design was part of a plan to build the
equality of states “into the foundations of the system” and ensure that it could not be bypassed
by amendment (quoting Thornton Anderson, Creating the Constitution: The Convention of 1787 and the First Congress 160 (1993))). Contra Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia
Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1043, 1044 (1988)
(arguing that a popular majority can amend the Constitution outside of Article V’s
procedures).
31. As explained in more detail below, at least twenty-five states include subject-matter
triggers or limitations that determine the appropriate process for certain proposed amendments. See G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Getting from Here to There: TwentyFirst Century Mechanisms and Opportunities in State Constitutional Reform, 36 Rutgers L.J.
1075, 1119–20 (2005) (describing subject-matter triggers and limitations in state constitutional amendment rules); infra Section IV.A (describing state amendment rules).
32. Mass. Const. amend art. XLVIII, pt. II, § 2; see also Dina E. Conlin, Note, The Ballot
Initiative in Massachusetts: The Fallacy of Direct Democracy, 37 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1087,
1091–92 (2004) (discussing Massachusetts’s amendment rules).
33. By “institutional dispute,” I simply mean a dispute regarding the scope of authority
of any branch, official, or level of government. See generally Barber & Fleming, supra note 25,
at 120 (describing “constitutional structures” in this way).
34. See, e.g., Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1961 (2015) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (arguing that “the Federal Government[’s] . . . authority is carefully defined by
the Constitution, and, except through Article V’s amendment process, that document does not
permit individuals to bestow additional power upon the Government”); McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 793–94 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that Article V gives the
task of “deciding . . . new rights” to “the people” and not courts (emphasis omitted)); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 427–28 (1956) (arguing that, if the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination has become “outmoded in the conditions of this modern
age, then the thing to do is to take it out of the Constitution, not to whittle it down by the
subtle encroachments of judicial opinion” (quoting Maffie v. United States, 209 F.2d 225, 227
(1st Cir. 1954))).

November 2016]

Amendment Creep

223

the Court should therefore reject constitutional rulings that bypass Article V
and effectively change the Constitution from the bench.35 In other words,
justices use Article V to suggest an implicit limitation on judicial review.36
Although this argument has been largely unsuccessful in carrying a majority
on the Supreme Court—probably because formal amendment is very difficult under Article V37—it has been successful at the state level.38 In fact, state
judges often seem receptive to the idea that their authority to effectuate constitutional change is restricted by the existence of flexible amendment rules
in state constitutions.39
Obviously, structural argument of any kind can be misused, and the
structural method has inherent limitations.40 Making arguments from context and drawing inferences from vague structural relationships can be a
dubious exercise.41 When untethered to other forms of constitutional argument like arguments from text, history, and doctrine, structuralism can
quickly become indeterminate and capable of manipulation.42 Amendmentbased structural reasoning is certainly not a panacea for all the practical and
theoretical problems that plague the quest for constitutional meaning. To
the extent judges and lawyers engage in structural argument, however, they
should pay close attention to amendment rules as an especially valuable and
35. Justice Harlan articulated the most sophisticated version of this argument. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 202–03 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XXVI; see also infra Section III.B.1 (discussing Justice Harlan’s opinion in detail).
36. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 793–94 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that judicial review does not authorize courts to “decid[e] what new rights to protect” because Article V gives
that power to the people). For scholarly discussion and support for this argument, see McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 8, at 81–90.
37. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406–10 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (stating that constitutional interpretations are “practically impossible” to change
through Article V amendments), overruled in part by Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp.,
303 U.S. 376 (1938).
38. See, e.g., State ex rel. Apt v. Mitchell, 399 P.2d 556, 559 (Kan. 1965) (reflecting that a
majority of the court rejected the proposed change in constitutional doctrine because “[t]his
court has no power to engraft amendments to our state constitution”).
39. See, e.g., Ex parte Melof, 735 So. 2d 1172, 1188–89 (Ala. 1999) (Houston, J., concurring specially) (arguing that the judiciary did not have the power to infer equal protection
guarantees from a state constitution that did not contain an explicit equal protection provision
because “recognition of the exclusive right of the people to change their own constitution is
inherent in the amendment procedure”); Hill v. State, 659 So. 2d 547, 554 (Miss. 1995) (Lee,
P.J., dissenting) (“If the people of Mississippi wish to provide convicted capital murderers with
such a constitutional right, then the citizens of this State, and not this Court, should amend
our constitution through the democratic process as has been done on many occasions.” (emphasis added)); McFarland v. Barron, 164 N.W.2d 607, 615 (S.D. 1969) (Biegelmeier, P.J., dissenting) (arguing that the court should reject the proposed interpretation of the state constitution
because the constitution could easily be amended to make the requested change).
40. See Dorf, supra note 23, at 838–44 (discussing limitations of the structural method).
41. See id. (describing the “open-endedness” of the structural method).
42. See id. at 841 (explaining that even Charles Black believed that “decisions reached via
the structural method should be examined for consistency with text, doctrine, and so forth”).
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rich source of information. Indeed, amendment rules are unique in the constitutional structure because they establish an ordered process for the people
to exercise their sovereign right to change the government.43 As such, they
express fundamental substantive and institutional preferences for how a society wishes to manage constitutional change.44
This Article has five parts: Part I provides a brief background on the
structural method of constitutional argument. Part II argues that, when
viewed through the lens of structural argument, amendment rules are an
especially valuable source of constitutional information. In Parts III and IV,
the Article systematizes the phenomenon of “amendment creep” within the
United States by constructing a typology of judicial arguments from Article
V’s amendment rules and amendment rules in state constitutions. The Article concludes in Part V by suggesting that amendment-based structural arguments are normatively valuable for a number of reasons.
I. Structuralism and Constitutional Meaning
Judges and lawyers ascertain constitutional meaning using various forms
of constitutional argument, such as text, history, and doctrine.45 One widely
recognized source of constitutional meaning is reasoning from the overall
structure of a constitution and its institutions.46 This modality of constitutional interpretation, known as “structuralism,” is particularly relevant to
how amendment rules might contribute to constitutional meaning. In this
Part, I describe two strands of structuralism: institutional structuralism and
interpretative holism.47 It is not my purpose here to enter into the tired
normative debate regarding the best method of constitutional interpretation.48 I take as my starting point that structuralism is a recognized form of
constitutional construction used by lawyers and judges.49 In the Parts that
43. See Holmes & Sunstein, supra note 21, at 276 (observing that “the amending power
trenches upon core issues of democracy and sovereignty”).
44. See id. at 277 (“A theory of the amending power must probe the difficult relationship
between constitutional limits on power and the limbo-inhabiting power to revise these
limits.”).
45. See generally Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation 11–22 (1991) (explaining that judges and lawyers use at least six “modalities” of constitutional argument to
prove that a constitutional proposition is true: historical, textual, structural, doctrinal, ethical,
and prudential).
46. See id. at 14–16 (describing structuralism); see also Bobbitt, supra note 24, at 74
(“Structural arguments are inferences from the existence of constitutional structures and the
relationships which the Constitution ordains among these structures.”).
47. See Dorf, supra note 23, at 834–38 (making this distinction).
48. Cf. Bobbitt, supra note 24, at 3 (describing the utility of various methods of interpretation in the judicial review debate as consuming “more discussion and more analysis than
any other issue in constitutional law”). In this Part, I describe the core features of a structural
approach to constitutional meaning. It is not my purpose to argue that structuralism is the
best approach to constitutional interpretation, or even that it is relevant for all constitutional
disputes.
49. Structuralism is only one of several “modalities” of constitutional argument that
judges and lawyers recognize as legitimate. See id. at 7 (describing the structural argument as
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follow, I argue that the nature of structural argumentation invites consideration of formal amendment rules as a particularly important, but often overlooked, source of constitutional meaning.
A. Institutional Relationships and Constitutional Meaning
“Institutional” structuralism maintains that one legitimate technique for
ascertaining constitutional meaning is examining the overall institutional
structure created by a constitution.50 Specifically, structuralism holds that
judges can resolve disputes regarding constitutional meaning by drawing inferences from the relationships between the institutions created by the relevant constitution—such as the legislature, the presidency, federalism,
democracy, and citizenship.51 Typically, this is done by testing a proposed
constitutional rule to see whether it conflicts or complies with an uncontroversial structural principle.52 This version of structuralism applies most
directly to disputes regarding the authority of government institutions, but
it can also be relevant to disputes regarding individual rights.53 A few examples are helpful to understand this approach to constitutional meaning.
“an archetype” of constitutional reasoning); id. at 3–8 (describing six modalities of constitutional argument that make up “a legal grammar that we all share”).
50. See Bobbitt, supra note 45, at 12 (defining structural constitutional analysis as “inferring rules from the relationships that the Constitution mandates among the structures it
sets up”); see also Dorf, supra note 23, at 834–38 (distinguishing institutional structuralism
from interpretive holism). Charles L. Black, Jr. was the most notable proponent of an institutional approach to constitutional adjudication. See id. at 833.
51. See Black, supra note 23, at 7 (describing structuralism as a “method of inference
from the structures and relationships created by the constitution in all its parts or in some
principal part”); Dorf, supra note 23, at 833 (describing Black’s structuralism as “a method of
constitutional interpretation in which the reader draws inferences from the relationship
among the structures of government—such as Congress, the Presidency, and the states”); see
also Barber & Fleming, supra note 25, at 117 (“[T]he structuralist looks to the overall constitutional arrangement of offices, powers, and relationships . . . . includ[ing] federalism, separation of powers, and democracy.” (emphases omitted)).
52. As Phillip Bobbitt has noted, structural arguments often follow a straightforward
logic:
[F]irst, an uncontroversial statement about a constitutional structure is introduced [for
example, . . . the right to vote for a member of Congress is provided for in the Constitution]; second, a relationship is inferred from this structure [that this right, for example,
gives rise to the federal power to protect it and is not dependent on state protection];
third, a factual assertion about the world is made [that, if unprotected, the structure of
federal representation would be at the mercy of local violence]. Finally, a conclusion is
drawn that provides the rule . . . .

Bobbitt, supra note 45, at 16 (alteration in original).
53. Barber & Fleming, supra note 25, at 117–18 (describing structuralism in institutional and rights disputes); Casey L. Westover, Structural Interpretation and The New Federalism: Finding the Proper Balance Between State Sovereignty and Federal Supremacy, 88 Marq. L.
Rev. 693, 700–04, 707–15 (2005) (discussing structural arguments in institutional cases, such
as Marbury v. Madison and McCulloch v. Maryland, and rights cases, such as Griswold v.
Connecticut).
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The classic example of structural constitutional interpretation is Chief
Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland.54 McCulloch involved
two issues: first, whether Congress had the power to create a federal bank,
and, second, whether Maryland could tax that federal bank.55 After concluding that Congress could create a federal bank,56 Chief Justice Marshall relied
heavily on a structural argument to support his conclusion that the Constitution prohibited Maryland from taxing the bank.57 According to Chief Justice Marshall, the Constitution did not permit Maryland to tax federal
agencies because such a power would conflict with the constitutional relationships between citizens, the states, and the federal government.58 Specifically, Chief Justice Marshall argued that the Constitution permitted
Maryland to tax its own citizens only because Maryland citizens were represented in their state legislature.59 The United States government, however,
represented all Americans, most of whom were not represented in the Maryland legislature.60 Thus, Chief Justice Marshall inferred from the Constitution’s institutional arrangements that Maryland could not tax the federal
government because such a tax would indirectly burden unrepresented
Americans in other states.61
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB) provides a contemporary example of structural constitutional interpretation.62 NFIB involved a challenge to the
“individual mandate” portion of the Affordable Care Act.63 The mandate
requires all individuals in the United States to have “minimum essential”
health insurance.64 A majority of the Court held that the mandate exceeded
54. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 428–29 (1819); see also Black,
supra note 23, at 13–15 (providing the most famous exposition of the structural arguments in
McCulloch); Bobbitt, supra note 24, at 78–79 (noting that Chief Justice Marshall’s arguments
in McCulloch were primarily structural).
55. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 322, 326.
56. See id. at 405–25 (resolving the first issue mostly by reference to the “prudential”
form of argumentation).
57. See id. at 425–37 (resolving the second issue through structural argumentation).
58. See id. at 428.
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 428–29; see also Bobbitt, supra note 45, at 15 (describing Chief Justice
Marshall’s argument). See Barber & Fleming, supra note 25, at 122–23, for criticism of Chief
Justice Marshall’s structural argument, noting that Chief Justice Marshall’s argument is not the
only way to resolve the case using structural argument, and, in fact, Chief Justice Marshall’s
argument is dependent on moral belief in John Locke’s political theory.
62. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585–89 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (using a structural argument to decide an application of the necessary and
proper clause); see also Manning, supra note 26, at 39–42 (describing the structural argument
in NFIB); id. at 34–39 (describing another contemporary example of structural argument in
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1977)).
63. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2580–81.
64. Id. at 2644 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (quoting 26 U.S.C.
§ 5000A(a) (2012)).
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Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper
Clause,65 but a different majority held that the mandate was nevertheless
constitutional as a federal tax.66 In concluding that the mandate exceeded the
Necessary and Proper clause, Chief Justice Roberts relied primarily on a
structural argument regarding the proper distribution of power between
Congress and the states.67 He interpreted the Necessary and Proper clause by
drawing inferences from the relationship between the federal government
and the states.68 He reasoned that allowing Congress to regulate inaction by
citizens would expand the scope of federal authority too far and unconstitutionally encroach on state authority.69 Chief Justice Roberts therefore rejected the government’s interpretation and concluded that the mandate
exceeded Congress’s authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause.70
Structural arguments can also inform decisions affecting individual
rights, especially rights related to free and equal political participation.71 For
example, Charles Black famously argued that the Constitution likely forbids
states from restricting certain forms of citizen speech, even without reference to the First Amendment.72 Black argued that implicit in the Constitution’s system of democratically elected congressional representatives is the
right of citizens to communicate with their federal representatives and fellow
citizens regarding federal politics.73 Based on this institutional inference,
65. Id. at 2585–93 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2644–50 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas,
and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (holding that the mandate exceeded Congress’s power under the
Necessary and Proper Clause).
66. Id. at 2594–2600 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (finding the mandate constitutional as a
tax); see also Manning, supra note 26, at 39–42 (describing different majority opinions).
67. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2585–93 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
68. See id. (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); see also Manning, supra note 26, at 41 (describing
the structural argument).
69. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2585–93 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). The logic of the Court’s
argument can be summarized as follows: (1) the Constitution clearly envisions a federal structure where there are some limits on Congress’s regulatory power; (2) holding that it is
“proper” for Congress to regulate inaction by citizens would expand Congress’s authority to
such an extent that state authority would be effectively lost; and (3) therefore, Congress may
not regulate citizen inaction. Id.
70. Id. at 2592–93.
71. The most famous structural argument related to democratic rights was developed by
John Hart Ely in Democracy and Distrust 73–101 (1980). See Barber & Fleming, supra
note 25, at 129–32 (describing Ely’s argument). Ely argues that, because the Constitution is
structured around a representative democracy, its design implies certain basic individual rights
to participate fairly in the democratic process. See Ely, supra, at 73–80. Although Ely used
structural reasoning, he also made a more substantive claim regarding the scope of legitimate
protections flowing from the Constitution. See Barber & Fleming, supra note 25, at 129–32
(describing Ely’s argument). According to Ely, the Constitution is intended to protect only
those rights necessary to ensure the proper functioning of representative democracy. Id.
72. Black, supra note 23, at 33–51; see also Dorf, supra note 23, at 837–38 (explaining
Black’s argument).
73. See id. at 838.
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Black concluded that the Constitution implicitly prohibits states from restricting political speech, even without the addition of the First Amendment’s more explicit protection of speech.74
The Supreme Court similarly relied on structuralism to define the scope
of federal power in the early case of Ex parte Yarbrough.75 The case involved
an appeal by several criminal defendants who were convicted in federal
court for intimidating an African American man from voting in a Congressional election.76 The defendants argued that the federal statute under which
they were convicted was unconstitutional because the Constitution did not
explicitly authorize Congress to enact such a law.77 In rejecting this argument, the Court reasoned that because the federal government was a republic comprised of elected representatives, “it must have the power to protect
the elections on which its existence depends from violence and corruption.”78 Thus, the Court concluded that the federal statute was constitutional, even without any explicit authorization, because Congress’s authority
was implicit in the constitutional structure.79
Structuralism is not without flaws and limitations. It is often criticized
for being too indeterminate and untethered to constitutional text, doctrine,
or history.80 Professor Laurence Tribe, for example, has argued that structuralism can result in “free-form” argumentation that shifts constitutional
74. See id.
75. See Bobbitt, supra note 45, at 15–16.
76. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 657 (1884); cf. Bobbitt, supra note 45, at 15–16
(discussing the structural argument in Yarbrough).
77. Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 658.
78. Id.
79. Further examples of the Court’s use of the structural method abound. See Bobbitt,
supra note 45, at 16 n.14 (providing an additional example of the structural method using
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)); Westover, supra note 53, at 699–715
(describing various Supreme Court examples). Moreover, structural reasoning is not limited to
federal constitutional interpretation. State courts have a rich history of using structural arguments when interpreting state constitutions. See Robert F. Williams & Lawrence Friedman, State Constitutional Law: Cases and Materials 878–84 (5th ed. 2015). The most
obvious examples come from state court opinions addressing the authority of municipalities.
See id. These cases require courts to determine the proper role of local government relative to
state government, which invariably prompts invocations of structural arguments regarding the
proper distribution of power between state and local government. For example, in Adler v.
Deegan, 167 N.E. 705, 713 (N.Y. 1929) (Cardozo, J., concurring), the New York Court of
Appeals considered whether the New York Constitution (which prohibited the state legislature
from passing laws related to the “property, affairs or government of cities”) prevented the
legislature from enacting legislation that regulated the design and construction of housing
within New York City. In concluding that the statute was constitutional, Judge Cardozo reasoned that, although some issues were “city affairs only” (such as “the laying out of parks, the
building of recreation piers, the institution of public concerts”), the state legislature retained
plenary legislative authority, while local governments could legislate only in areas of local
concern. Id. Thus, because the construction and design of housing in New York City im plicated both state and local concerns, the state legislature had authority to regulate the issue,
even though it also touched on issues of local concern. Id.
80. See, e.g., Barber & Fleming, supra note 25, at 129–32 (criticizing the structural
method as indeterminate and dependent on moral or philosophical judgment); Dorf, supra
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disputes to a degree of generality where any result is justifiable.81 Indeed,
structuralism often cuts both ways in a constitutional dispute. In McCulloch,
for example, Maryland advanced its own structural argument regarding
Congress’s authority to create a national bank.82 According to Maryland, the
Constitution’s federal structure implied that Congress could regulate “only
when absolutely necessary” to advance limited “national objectives.”83 And,
according to Maryland, a bank was not necessary to achieve any legitimate
national objectives.84
The primary response to criticisms that the structural method is indeterminate is to emphasize that structuralism operates alongside other forms
of constitutional argumentation. Charles Black, for example, emphasized
that structuralism does not “supplant” other methods of constitutional interpretation.85 Rather, “decisions reached via the structural method should
be examined for consistency with text, doctrine, and so forth.”86 When integrated with other forms of constitutional interpretation, structuralism presumably becomes less open-ended and more useful for identifying
constitutional meaning.87
The literature illustrating and debating structuralism’s limitations is
vast. It is not necessary to rehash it here. My purpose is only to note that,
subject to these limitations, one legitimate form of constitutional argumentation is to draw inferences from constitutional institutions. This general
point is important because, as I explain below, a constitution’s amendment
rules can give rise to important institutional inferences relevant to myriad
constitutional issues.
note 23, at 838–44 (discussing limitations of the structural method); Manning, supra note 26,
at 31–32 (discussing specific problems with trends in structural reasoning).
81. See Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1221, 1227 (1995). For further
discussion of the indeterminacy objection, see Bobbitt, supra note 24, at 84–85 (“Structural
arguments are sometimes accused of being indeterminate because while we can all agree on
the presence of the various structures, we fall to bickering when called upon to decide whether
a particular result is necessarily inferred from their relationships.”).
82. Barber & Fleming, supra note 25, at 123.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 121–23. The “open-endedness” of the structural method is also illustrated
by the Supreme Court’s rulings during the Lochner era. See Dorf, supra note 23, at 838.
85. Dorf, supra note 23, at 841 (describing Black’s position on this issue); see also Black,
supra note 23, at 31 (“There is . . . a close and perpetual interworking between the textual and
the relational and structural modes of reasoning, for the structure and relations concerned are
themselves created by the text, and inference drawn from them must surely be controlled by
the text.”).
86. Dorf, supra note 23, at 841 (summarizing Black’s view). Black also noted, however,
that structuralism is often no less open-ended than other forms of constitutional argumentation. See id. at 840–41.
87. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189 (1987) (arguing that all modalities of constitutional argument should be integrated).
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B. “Interpretative Holism”
“Structuralism” is also used to describe a form of constitutional interpretation where judges ascertain constitutional meaning by looking to the
overall structure of the constitution itself.88 This approach is not necessarily
concerned with the relative arrangement of government institutions, but
rather the context of a particular provision within the constitutional document as a whole.89 This strand of structuralism (often called “interpretative
holism”) is grounded in the common sense maxim that “words are to be
interpreted in accordance with their context.”90 This approach to constitutional meaning can incorporate basic canons of construction, but it is
broader than these textualist rules.
By emphasizing constitutional context in the interpretive process, interpretive holism encourages judges to find evidence of constitutional meaning
by examining a constitution’s “patterns and premises, layout and logic, assumptions and animating principles.”91 By looking at “the document holistically,” judges may be able to identify “overarching” substantive “themes”
that can shed light on issues that the text does not explicitly address and help
to resolve textual ambiguities.92
Judges can use interpretive holism in various ways depending on the
circumstances and the provision at issue.93 Sometimes, this method of interpretation involves drawing inferences from the precise location of a provision within a constitution94 or from the use of major divisions within the
document itself.95 The federal Constitution, for example, does not include a
provision explicitly prohibiting one branch of government from exercising
the powers of another branch, but the Court has nevertheless inferred a
general separation of powers principle based on the document’s division
into separate articles for each major branch.96 Interpretive holism might also
88. See Jackson, supra note 2 (describing a holistic approach to structuralism); see also
Dorf, supra note 23, at 841 (clearly distinguishing between institutional structuralism and
holistic interpretation).
89. See Akhil Reed Amar, Architexture, 77 Ind. L.J. 671, 696 (2002) (referring to this as
“locational textualism”). See generally Mehrdad Payandeh, Constitutional Aesthetics: Appending
Amendments to the United States Constitution, 25 B.Y.U. J. Pub. L. 87, 121 (2011) (listing
various labels and descriptions of this interpretative approach).
90. See Dorf, supra note 23, at 835.
91. Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or Immunities
Revival Portend the Future—Or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 110, 110
n.3 (1999).
92. Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 26,
30 (2000) (“For example, the phrases ‘separation of powers’ and ‘checks and balances’ appear
nowhere in the Constitution, but these organizing concepts are part of the document, read
holistically.”).
93. See Jackson, supra note 2, at 1281 n.95 (explaining different uses).
94. See Amar, supra note 89, at 697–98 (describing this interpretative technique).
95. See Amar, supra note 92, at 30.
96. See id. (“Each of the three great departments—legislative, executive, judicial—is
given its own separate article, introduced by a separate vesting clause. To read these three
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involve drawing inferences from the repeated use of the same (or similar)
phrases in various places throughout a constitution.97 In any event, there are
various contextual techniques emanating from a holistic methodology that
courts utilize and recognize.98
Aside from these contextual techniques, the most powerful (and controversial) aspect of holistic interpretation might be the ability to identify substantive values beneath a constitution’s text.99 In Printz v. United States, for
example, the Court considered whether Congress could require local officials to execute federal law.100 Following a lengthy historical discussion, the
majority opinion used structural analysis to answer that question.101 The
Court argued that “[i]t is incontestible that the Constitution established a
system of ‘dual sovereignty’ ” because there are allusions to state sovereignty
throughout the “Constitution’s text.”102 Specifically, the Court identified the
following:
[T]he prohibition on any involuntary reduction or combination of a State’s
territory, Art. IV, § 3; the Judicial Power Clause, Art. III, § 2, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Art. IV, § 2, which speak of the “Citizens” of
the States; the amendment provision, Article V, which requires the votes of
three-fourths of the States to amend the Constitution; and the Guarantee
Clause, Art. IV, § 4, which “presupposes the continued existence of the
states and . . . those means and instrumentalities which are the creation of
their sovereign and reserved rights.”103

vesting clauses as an ensemble (as their conspicuously parallel language and parallel placement
would seem to invite) is to see a plain statement of separated powers.”); Westover, supra note
53, at 705 (describing the Supreme Court’s analysis in Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986),
as using holistic interpretation to build the federal doctrine of separation of powers).
97. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 747, 748 (1999) (describing
and defending this interpretative technique).
98. Vicki Jackson has argued that chronology is also an important contextual factor because later amendments have fundamentally altered the Constitution’s emphasis as a whole.
See Jackson, supra note 2, at 1261–62 (“I sketch . . . a form of holistic, structural interpretation
[that is] attentive to temporal vectors of analysis that help reconcile constitutionalism with
democracy—by which I mean looking at older parts of the Constitution through the lens of
more recent amendments in understanding what the Constitution as a whole has become.”).
99. See Westover, supra note 53, at 707–15 (describing how Justice Douglas’s “penumbra” analysis in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), was a form of holistic analysis
and surveying the many criticisms of that analysis).
100. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
101. Printz, 521 U.S. at 918 (“We turn next to consideration of the structure of the Constitution, to see if we can discern among its ‘essential postulate[s],’ a principle that controls the
present cases.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Principality of Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1932))).
102. Id. at 918–19 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991)).
103. Id. at 919 (alteration in original) (quoting Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405,
414–15 (1938)).
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Reading these provisions as a whole, the Court concluded that the Constitution “contemplates that a State’s government will represent and remain accountable to its own citizens,” and Congress cannot therefore commandeer
state officials to do the nation’s work.104
Printz is just one example of the Court using a holistic reading of the
Constitution to identify deeper constitutional values.105 This interpretive
technique is not uncommon, although it can be controversial because of its
subtextual nature. My purpose here is not to evaluate holistic interpretation
from a normative perspective. My point is only that holistic techniques are a
recognized form of constitutional argument, which can involve drawing inferences from the structure, organization, and even chronology of the document as a whole. As explained below, formal amendment rules are a
particularly valuable source of constitutional meaning because of their
unique function in the constitutional structure.
II. Amendment Rules and Constitutional Meaning
Amendment rules have “unsurpassed importance” because they “define
the conditions under which all other constitutional norms may be legally
displaced.”106 Thus, as I have argued elsewhere,107 amendment rules are “at
the core of constitutionalism” because they separate constitutional law from
ordinary legislation,108 establish manageable processes for popular involvement in constitutional change,109 and provide a check on government actors.110 In this Part, I argue that, when viewed through the lens of structural
argument, amendment rules can be a particularly valuable source of constitutional meaning. Specifically, I suggest that amendment rules can inform
104. Id. at 920.
105. There are other examples of structural analysis in rights cases. The most well-known
example of this form of constitutional argumentation is Justice Douglas’s opinion in Griswold
v. Connecticut. See Westover, supra note 53, at 707–15. In Griswold, Justice Douglas located an
individual right to privacy in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 381 U.S. 479,
484 (1965). In reaching this conclusion, Justice Douglas reasoned that various provisions
within the Constitution—such as the right of association in the First Amendment, the Third
Amendment right against quartering soldiers, the Fourth Amendment right against unlawful
searches, and the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination—“create a zone of privacy.” Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. Justice Douglas then concluded that the zone of privacy
emanating from the Constitution prohibited Connecticut from denying a person access to
contraception. Id.
106. Amar, supra note 22, at 461; see Richard Albert, The Structure of Constitutional
Amendment Rules, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 913, 913–14 (2014) (discussing the function and
importance of amendment rules); Dixon & Holden, supra note 7, at 195 (same).
107. Jonathan L. Marshfield, Decentralizing the Amendment Power, 19 Lewis & Clark L.
Rev. 963, 968 (2015).
108. Id.; see András Sajó, Limiting Government: An Introduction to Constitutionalism 39–40 (Cent. European Univ. Press trans., 1999) (explaining the role of amendment rules in ensuring that constitutions operate as higher law).
109. See Dixon & Holden, supra note 7, at 195–97.
110. Albert, supra note 106, at 913–14.
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structural arguments by providing insight into substantive constitutional
priorities as well as a constitution’s overall institutional design.111
A. Amendment Rules and Substantive Values
Most scholars recognize that constitutions are animated by “broad
norms and basic commitments” that exist underneath the enforceable rules
created by a constitution.112 These sublegal principles are “the foundation of
any constitutional regime” because they can provide guidance to political
actors when resolving uncertain constitutional issues.113 Judges, for example,
draw on constitutional values when evaluating various suggested interpretations of a constitutional provision.114
An important (but often overlooked) function of constitutional amendment rules is their ability to “express” or signal constitutional values.115 This
can happen in at least two ways: First, as Richard Albert has explained, “escalating amendment thresholds” for specific subjects can indicate a “rankordering” of constitutional priorities.116 This conclusion is based on the reasonable assumption that constitutional designers may choose to make more
important constitutional values harder to amend (or even declare them to be
unamendable).117 Variation in the difficulty of amendment is used as a signaling device to indicate to political actors which constitutional values
should be prioritized.
Sanford Levinson has argued that Article V operates in this way because
it “varies the difficulty of the amendment process with the perceived importance of given issues.”118 Article V’s deep entrenchment of equal state representation in the Senate suggests that federalism is an especially important
value in the federal constitutional structure because it is subject to more
111. This is not an exhaustive list. Amendment rules can give rise to myriad structural
inferences, but these two forms of amendment-based structural reasoning are especially pertinent and illustrative of how amendment rules can inform constitutional meaning.
112. See Holmes & Sunstein, supra note 21, at 276–80.
113. Albert, supra note 10, at 239.
114. See id. (“Constitutional values are the equivalent of a trump card in constitutional
adjudication . . . .”).
115. Id. at 236–37; see also Holmes & Sunstein, supra note 21, at 279 (“[The amending
power] helps explain how various framers conceived the relationship between procedure and
substance, for instance, or the distinction between the core and the periphery of the constitutional order.”).
116. Albert, supra note 10, at 245–47.
117. Id. at 247. This is only one of many inferences that can be drawn from a hierarchy of
entrenchment. Id. at 247, 251 (explaining that escalating amendment thresholds do not always
indicate a hierarchy of priorities); see also Richard Albert, American Exceptionalism in Constitutional Amendment, 69 Ark. L. Rev. 217, 237 (2016) (explaining that escalating amendment
rules and unamendable provisions can be products of bargain formation).
118. Sanford Levinson, The Political Implications of Amending Clauses, 13 Const. Comment. 107, 122 (1996) (describing Article V’s amendment process).
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arduous amendment procedures.119 From a comparative perspective, there is
compelling evidence that escalating amendment thresholds in the Canadian
and South African constitutions were intended to establish a clear “hierarchy” of constitutional values.120
Of course, there may be other explanations for variation in the difficulty
of amendment procedures.121 Difficulty in the amendment process might
reflect political compromise and not constitutional significance.122 That is,
constitutional designers may use escalating amendment procedures to secure
a hard-fought political compromise on a destabilizing issue without intending to elevate that issue’s constitutional significance over other, uncontested constitutional priorities.123 For example, Article V made the
importation and census-based taxation clauses of Article I unamendable until 1808.124 This reflected the hard-fought compromise between slave states
and free states regarding federal power over the slave trade.125 The founders
made those clauses temporarily unamendable because each side feared that
the other would use the amendment process to undo the compromise, not
because the clauses necessarily expressed an elevated constitutional
priority.126
In any event, escalating amendment rules can sometimes provide insight
into a hierarchy of constitutional values. This, of course, can be valuable
information for a judge or lawyer engaged in a dispute regarding constitutional meaning.127 When faced with a choice between two competing claims
for constitutional meaning, amendment rules might help a judge assess
those claims by favoring the claim that is most consistent with a constitution’s hierarchy of priorities.128
119. See id. Article V’s reference to the Importation Clause and census-based taxation
clauses also reinforce the idea that federalism was at least a historically important value. See
Albert, supra note 10, at 228–29.
120. See Albert, supra note 10, at 247–51 (discussing constitutional values and escalating
entrenchment in the constitutions of Canada, South Africa, Ghana, Nigeria, and India).
121. See Albert, supra note 28, at 15 (describing various explanations for variation in
amendment procedures and unamendable provisions).
122. See id.; see also Albert, supra note 117 (manuscript at 14) (on file with Michigan Law
Review) (explaining “bargain-formation” as an explanation for unamendable provisions).
123. See Albert, supra note 28, at 15.
124. See U.S. Const. art. V (“Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to
the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth
Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article . . . .”).
125. See Richard B. Bernstein with Jerome Agel, Amending America 27 (1993) (explaining the history of Article V and its reference to the importation and taxation clauses).
126. See id. at 19, 27 (discussing John Rutledge as a Southern spokesperson who advocated for this change to Article V during the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention).
127. See Albert, supra note 10, at 239, 269–80 (describing how the German Constitutional
Court has used Germany’s formal amendment rules in constitutional adjudication).
128. Of course, amendment rules are only one potential source of evidence regarding a
hierarchy of priorities. See id. at 240–44 (explaining that constitutional theory, constitutional
interpretation, and a constitution’s preamble can all be sources of a constitution’s hierarchy of
values). Moreover, I do not mean to oversimplify constitutional adjudication by suggesting
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But amendment rules may incorporate constitutional values even without escalating amendment thresholds. The general structure of the amendment process can reveal a great deal about a society’s political process
priorities.129 Some amendment procedures, for example, require amendments to be published in several specific languages or require specific groups
to ratify amendments or both.130 These requirements suggest a strong commitment to political inclusion for certain linguistic or minority groups.
Other amendment rules are obviously designed to elevate public deliberation over the aggregation of individual preferences because they require proposed amendments to be ratified by successive, separately elected legislatures
rather than by a public referendum.131 And, as noted above, amendment
rules that impose no substantive limitations on the amendment process
might suggest that a society values freedom of expression regarding even the
most revolutionary political ideas.132 Although these sorts of amendment
procedures do not provide a clear “rank-ordering” of constitutional values,
they do hint at a society’s deep commitments because they express how a
society intends to maintain and update its fundamental law.133
To be sure, inferring constitutional values from amendment rules can be
an uncertain exercise, and not all amendment rules provide meaningful

that a hierarchy of constitutional priorities derived from amendment rules will make adjudication formulaic, determinate, and unequivocally legitimate. Sound constitutional reasoning implicates myriad concerns besides amendment-based structural reasoning, or structural
reasoning of any kind, for that matter. See Jackson, supra note 2, at 1287 (arguing that structural arguments must invariably give way “to the primary goal of a constitution, which is to
provide a stable framework for a just and workable government”).
129. See Holmes & Sunstein, supra note 21, at 277–79 (“The form taken by the amending
power, in other words, sheds light on the variety of theories underlying different liberal
democracies.”).
130. See, e.g., N.M. Const. art. XIX, § 1 (“The secretary of state shall also make reasonable efforts to provide notice of the content and purpose of legislatively approved constitutional
amendments in indigenous languages and to minority language groups to inform electors
about the amendments.”); see also Marshfield, supra note 107, at 967 (surveying the world’s
constitutions for amendment rules that require inclusion of subnational groups in the amendment process and finding that approximately one-third of all national constitutions have
amendment rules that include subnational groups in some way).
131. See, e.g., Del. Const. art. XVI, § 1; Neth. Const. ch. 8, arts. 137–38; see also Bjørn
Erik Rasch & Roger D. Congleton, Amendment Procedures and Constitutional Stability, in Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy 319, 331 (Roger D. Congleton & Birgitta Swedenborg eds., 2006) (discussing the deliberative values inherent in the Netherland’s
amendment rules).
132. See Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 57 (1967) (relying on Article V to interpret the
First Amendment as protecting the right to advocate wholesale alteration of the U.S. government); Holmes & Sunstein, supra note 21, at 278 (“The amending power, as it exists in some
Western liberal-democratic constitutions, implies that the basic framework of political life can
be wholly changed, as long as a proper procedural benediction is secured.”).
133. See generally Holmes & Sunstein, supra note 21, at 277–79 (discussing the connection
and tension between constitutional values and amendment procedures).
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insight into a society’s deep commitments.134 Moreover, even when amendment rules display clear constitutional values, those values can be hard to
define and utilize because they are often stated “at a high level of generality”
and without any clear ordering of priority.135 Nevertheless, many amendment rules include discernable substantive values, which can make them an
important source of constitutional meaning for judges and lawyers engaged
in structural argument.
B. Amendment Rules and Institutional Arrangements
Aside from signaling substantive constitutional values, amendment rules
may also inform judges regarding relationships between constitutional institutions. Amendment rules are unique in the constitutional structure because
they establish a democratic process for changing a society’s fundamental
law.136 They create an ordered procedure for the people to exercise their
sovereign right to change the law that establishes and limits government
institutions.137 As such, they express institutional preferences for how a society wishes to manage constitutional change,138 as well as how accountable to
majorities a constitutional democracy aims to be.139
For example, constitutional provisions that are unamendable or very
difficult to amend may suggest a preference for informal amendment
through judicial interpretation, as opposed to formal amendment through
democratic processes.140 Indeed, the “predictable” consequence of making
134. See Albert, supra note 10, at 229 (noting that some amendment rules might not
reveal much about a constitution’s priorities).
135. See id. at 240 (explaining that constitutional values are inherently contestable).
136. See Akhil Reed Amar, Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Amendment, in Responding to Imperfection, supra note 9, at 89–90, 111 (arguing that amendment rules are
tied to popular sovereignty but cannot limit popular sovereignty).
137. See id. at 91 (“The Constitution is supreme law, and the legal rules it establishes for
its own amendment are of unsurpassed importance, for these rules define the conditions
under which all other constitutional norms may be legally displaced.”).
138. See Holmes & Sunstein, supra note 21, at 279 (“Every functioning liberal democracy
depends on a variety of techniques for introducing flexibility into the constitutional framework. The two usual methods are, first, amendment and, second, judicial interpretation in the
light of evolving circumstances and social norms. There are intriguing interaction or mutual
compensation effects of constitutional amendment and constitutional interpretation, and
these can help us understand better the relationship between the judiciary and the political
branches.” (footnotes omitted)).
139. See Causeway Med. Suite v. Ieyoub, 109 F.3d 1096, 1115–16 (5th Cir. 1997) (Garza,
J., concurring specially) (explaining that Article V was intended to protect the Constitution
from “contemporary, majority viewpoints”); see also Holmes & Sunstein, supra note 21, at 277
(“[T]he procedural obstacles to easy constitutional amendment form the core of the countermajoritarian dilemma.”).
140. See Melissa Schwartzberg, Democracy and Legal Change 184 (2007) (explaining the relationship between amendment difficulty and institutional channeling of constitutional change); see also Holmes & Sunstein, supra note 21, at 279–80 (explaining many
nuanced, institutional effects that amendment difficulty can have on constitutional regimes);
id. at 278 (“[A] stringent amending formula . . . might seem to suggest a bias for liberalism
against democracy.”). Of course, difficulty in the amendment process might simply suggest
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provisions difficult to amend is to “grant[ ] the judiciary the power to interpret the meaning”141 and “legitimate scope of mutability” of those provisions.142 In other words, the judiciary may infer from rigid amendment
procedures that the people intended constitutional changes to occur, at least
to some extent, through judicial review rather than democratic processes.143
As discussed in more detail below, the United States Supreme Court has
explicitly adopted a pragmatic version of this reasoning in its stare decisis
jurisprudence.144
On the other hand, amendment rules that establish few barriers to formal amendment may suggest a preference for constitutional change to occur
primarily through democratic processes and formal amendment of the constitution’s text.145 This preference is implicit in the fact that the amendment
rules make formal amendment through democratic processes very easy to
achieve, and because flexible amendment procedures ensure that government officials remain accountable to popular constitutional preferences.146 If
amendment rules suggest a preference for constitutional change to occur
through formal amendment, then judges may be justified in exercising restraint when interpreting easily amended constitutional provisions.147 There
is evidence that the desire for judicial restraint motivated populist reforms
that the constitution was designed to have few amendments of any kind (formal or informal).
See Sanford Levinson, Introduction: Imperfection and Amendability, in Responding to Imperfection, supra note 9, at 3, 4 (quoting and discussing the 1669 Fundamental Constitutions of
Carolina, which declared, “these fundamental constitutions shall be and remain the sacred and
unalterable form and rule of government . . . forever”). But this inference seems weak because
it ignores the pressures for constitutional rules to change over time. See Marshfield, supra note
107, at 972–77 (explaining various reasons that constitutional rules experience pressure to
change over time). Indeed, even where constitutional drafters have intended to make constitutional rules static and immune from formal amendment, the result has been judicial “updating” of those rules over time, and not constitutional stagnation, which usually corresponds
with constitutional failure. See Schwartzberg, supra, at 184 (explaining that attempts to stagnate constitutional rules are effective only at transferring the locus of constitutional change to
the judiciary).
141. Albert, supra note 10, at 269.
142. See Schwartzberg, supra note 140, at 184.
143. See Albert, supra note 10, at 270 (explaining that the German Constitutional Court
has inferred great authority to interpret and change the meaning of an unamendable provision
in the German Constitution); see also Holmes & Sunstein, supra note 21, at 279 (explaining
that the judiciary can “benefit from a stringent amending procedure,” because it will gain
“prestige” by “pos[ing] as the guardian of the ark of the covenant”).
144. See infra Section III.B.3 (explaining that the Court has explicitly stated that one reason it will change its own constitutional rulings is because amendment under Article V is
“practically impossible”).
145. See Holmes & Sunstein, supra note 21, at 278 (“The very existence of an amending
formula . . . might suggest a bias for democratic procedure over moral substance.”).
146. See Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy 218–25 (2d ed. 2012) (exploring the
relationship between amendment rigidity and judicial review generally).
147. See G. Alan Tarr, Without Fear or Favor: Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountability in the States 177–78 (2012) (“[I]f a more popular constitutionalism
operates . . . , then political energies are more likely to be devoted to the substance of the
law.”).
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to amendment rules in state constitutions during the Progressive Era.148
And, as discussed in more detail below, state judges frequently rely on the
existence of accessible amendment procedures to support their rejection of
transformative constitutional rulings.149
148. Records from various state constitutional conventions demonstrate that delegates
sometimes modified state amendment rules to be more flexible specifically to ensure that state
judges were not spearheading constitutional change. See John J. Dinan, The American State
Constitutional Tradition 37 (2006) (quoting a Progressive Era debate at the Kentucky
Constitutional Convention: “Experience teaches that when Constitutions are too difficult to
amend, they will be changed in spite of written restrictions” (quoting 2 Official Report of
the Proceedings and Debates of the Kentucky Constitutional Convention 1659
(1890))); id. at 49 (noting that amendment procedures were changed to be easier to amend in
part because judges were “creating novel interpretations . . . to overturn popular legislation”);
id. at 50–51 (“Delegates also expected that the mere presence of a more flexible amendment
procedure would influence judicial behavior by permitting well-intentioned judges to play a
reduced role in updating constitutional provisions. The idea was that certain judges had taken
an active role in constitutional interpretation in part as a consequence of the rigidity of the
constitutional amendment process. These judges believed, understandably, that they alone
were in a position to perform the necessary updating of constitutional doctrines.”); John
Dinan, Foreword: Court-Constraining Amendments and the State Constitutional Tradition, 38
Rutgers L.J. 983, 1025–28 (2007) (noting that courts understood easy amendment to impact
their role and that they deferred to amendments and assumed a more restrained role). One
Progressive Era scholar has been quoted as saying:
[I]nasmuch as the constitutions of the states are, comparatively speaking, rather easy of
amendment, it has frequently happened that subsequent to a decision of a state court
that an act of the state legislature is unconstitutional, the state constitution has been so
changed as to remove all objections to the passage of the statute from the point of view of
the state constitution. The natural result is that the limitations of the state constitutions
as interpreted by the state courts are not serious permanent obstacles to social reform,
either in the matter of labor legislation, or, indeed, in any other matter in which change
is desired.

Id. at 1024 (quoting Frank J. Goodnow, Social Reforms and the Constitution 30
(1911)).
149. See infra Section IV.B.1 (explaining that state judges commonly cite to ease of
amendment as a basis for rejecting transformative constitutional rulings); see also Lutz, supra
note 9, at 167–68 (2006) (summarizing amendment procedures from around the world and
finding that amendment rigidity generally corresponds with informal amendment by the judiciary). But see Michael Besso, Constitutional Amendment Procedures and the Informal Political
Construction of Constitutions, 67 J. Pol. 69, 75 (2005) (explaining that informal political construction of constitutions takes place in states regardless of the “relative ease of state constitutional amendment”). Amendment rules can also provide insight into other institutional
doctrines besides judicial review. Article V, for example, is slightly unusual from a comparative
perspective because it does not provide any opportunity for a public referendum regarding
amendments. See Lutz, supra note 9, at 167–68; see also Albert, supra note 106, at 947–48
(noting that the U.S. Constitution is the only one that “entrenches the exceptional multi-track
framework”). Instead, amendments are ratified by a supermajority of state legislatures or state
conventions. See U.S. Const. art. V. This process, which favors smaller states at the expense of
democratic values, suggests that federalism is at the Constitution’s core. See Baker, supra note
29, at 947–58 (explaining how Article V benefits smaller states). See generally Holmes & Sunstein, supra note 21, at 280 (making the connection between amendment ru les and institutional relationships by noting that “[s]tringent amending formulas will allow parliaments
faced with large social problems to deflect social disapprobation and to escape democratic
accountability in difficult times”).
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Again, reasoning from amendment rules to general constitutional principles can be dubious and indeterminate when the practice is detached from
other interpretive techniques. Amendment-based arguments can often cut
both ways.150: Amendment rules that make a provision very difficult to
amend, for example, might signal that those provisions should remain relatively static and unchanged by any institution, including the judiciary. Conversely, amendment rules that make provisions very easy to amend could
signal that the judiciary can experiment with progressive constructions, because the people can easily correct any errors through amendment.151
However, indeterminacy is inherent to some degree in any form of
structural analysis. As Charles Black recognized, structural arguments cannot be deployed in isolation.152 They must be “examined for consistency
with text, doctrine, and so forth.”153 Amendment-based argument is not a
superior or more determinate form of constitutional reasoning that can supplant all other forms of constitutional analysis. It is, however, highly relevant
to institutional relationships. Indeed, other than provisions specially addressing judicial authority, amendment rules are among the most relevant
provisions for resolving disputes about the appropriate scope of judicial review because they establish and define the only constitutional institution
that provides a check on the judiciary—the amendment power. Thus, to the
extent constitutional disputes turn on the appropriate scope of judicial review, amendment rules would seem to be a critical source of constitutional
meaning.
III. Amendment Creep in Federal Constitutional Interpretation
The prior Parts of this Article have focused on the theoretical possibility
of using amendment rules to further structural interpretation. I have argued
that amendment rules can, in theory, contain important substantive and
institutional information that judges can use—consistent with the structural
method—when resolving constitutional disputes unrelated to formal
amendment. In this Part, I explore the amendment-based arguments that
courts have actually made when interpreting provisions of the federal Constitution. I begin by briefly describing the Article V amendment process. I

150. See Holmes & Sunstein, supra note 21, at 279 (“The free availability of amendment
may have a range of diverse effects on the courts.”); see also Ex parte Lewis, 219 S.W.3d 335,
374–75 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (Cochran, J., concurring) (noting that arguments from ease of
amendment can support both judicial restraint and judicial activism).
151. See Holmes & Sunstein, supra note 21, at 279 (“If it is easy to amend the Constitution, the stakes of constitutional decision are lowered, [which] . . . . may embolden the
court.”); see also A. E. Dick Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the
Burger Court, 62 Va. L. Rev. 873, 939 (1976) (“At least one state judge has cited the ease of
amending state constitutions as a justification for an activist position.”).
152. See Black, supra note 23, at 31.
153. Dorf, supra note 23, at 841.
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then systematize the phenomenon of amendment creep in federal constitutional interpretation by constructing a typology of recognized judicial arguments based on Article V’s amendment rules. These arguments can generally
be grouped into three categories: First, several justices have relied on Article
V to construct institutional arguments regarding the appropriate judicial
role in deciding constitutional cases. Second, the Supreme Court has occasionally relied on substantive policies implicit in Article V’s amendment
procedures as support for their rulings regarding the freedom of association
and expression. Finally, the Supreme Court has relied on Article V’s deep
entrenchment of federalism principles to justify rulings prohibiting federal
commandeering of state officials and limiting Congress’s implementation
authority under the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. The Article V Amendment Process
Article V provides two basic paths for amendment.154 First, amendments
can be proposed by Congress and then sent to state legislatures (or state
conventions) for ratification.155Amendments must then be passed by twothirds of the representatives in both the House and the Senate to be sent to
the states, and three-fourths of the states must ratify proposed amendments.156 The second pathway for amendment is state-originated.157 Two154. Article V provides in its entirety:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose
Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds
of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either
Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified
by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three
fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the
Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in
the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be
deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.

U.S. Const. art. V. For a helpful summary of the history behind Article V, see David E.
Kyvig, Explicit and Authentic Acts: Amending the U.S. Constitution, 1776–1995, at
20–65 (1996), and Monaghan, supra note 30, at 126–31 (describing Article V’s design and
history).
155. U.S. Const. art. V; see also Monaghan, supra note 30, at 125–26 (describing Article
V’s amendment procedures).
156. For a helpful discussion of the procedures for ratification and the Supreme Court’s
opinions regarding ratification procedures, see John R. Vile, The Constitutional Amending Process in American Political Thought 157–73 (1992). Congress may impose reasonable time limitations on ratification, but it does not have to. See Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S.
368 (1921) (holding that Congress has the authority to impose reasonable time limits on
ratification). In fact, the Twenty-Seventh Amendment was finally ratified almost 200 years
after it was initially proposed. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The
Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 Yale L.J. 677, 764–89 (1993)
(explaining the ratification of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment).
157. See U.S. Const. art. V (“[O]r, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of
the several States . . . .”).
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thirds of the state legislatures can call a convention for the purpose of proposing amendments, each of which must then be ratified by three-fourths of
the states.158 These processes apply to amendments addressing any subject,
with one exception: “[N]o State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its
equal Suffrage in the Senate.”159
There are two features of Article V that are important for present purposes. First, Article V is very general in its application.160 Many modern national constitutions contain amendment rules with subject-matter triggers
that set out different amendment rules for different subjects, and some even
make certain subjects or provisions categorically unamendable.161 Germany’s
Basic Law, for example, famously declares that its human dignity and rights
clauses are unamendable.162 Other amendment rules establish different
amendment processes or thresholds for particular subjects.163 Canada’s
amendment rules, for example, include five different amendment tracks
based on subject.164 As noted above, these subject-matter triggers are
significant because they may provide insight into a society’s constitutional

158. Id.; see also James Kenneth Rogers, Note, The Other Way to Amend the Constitution:
The Article V Constitutional Convention Amendment Process, 30 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 1005,
1014–15 (2007) (describing the convention process).
159. U.S. Const. art. V. Article V also contains a clause making certain provisions temporarily unamendable. See Richard Albert, Constitutional Disuse or Desuetude: The Case of Article
V, 94 B.U. L. Rev. 1029, 1040–42 (2014) (explaining the history behind the temporal inability
to amend the census-based taxation provision and importation provision). Moreover, from
time to time, some have argued that there are implicit substantive limitations on Article V
amendments. See Vile, supra note 156, at 157–73 (summarizing various arguments by litigants
before the Supreme Court and in the academy suggesting limitations on Article V amendments); see also Albert, supra note 28, at 14, 24–27 (arguing that free speech rights are implicitly unamendable under Article V).
160. See U.S. Const. amend. V; cf. Albert, supra note 106, at 947–48 (describing the U.S.
amendment procedure in a comparative context).
161. See Albert, supra note 159, at 1037–38 (placing Article V in a comparative context);
Albert, supra note 106, at 936–56 (describing amendment procedures in contemporary democracies around the world and identifying various national constitutions that embed subject-matter triggers into their amendment rules).
162. See Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], art. 1 § 1, translation at http://www.gesetzeim-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0015 [https://perma.cc/A6QU-J6WU]
(“Human dignity shall be inviolable.”); id. art. 79 § 3 (making the human dignity provision
unamendable); see also Albert, supra note 10, at 265–66 (discussing the provision).
163. See Albert, supra note 106, at 942–46 (describing the constitutions of India, South
Africa, Botswana, Malta, Mauritius, Canada, Chile, Estonia, and Spain as having this structure); infra Section IV.A (providing the results from an exhaustive study of subject-matter
triggers in state constitutional amendment rules and finding that at least eight states currently
have subject-matter triggers of some kind in their amendment rules).
164. See Albert, supra note 106, at 944–45 (describing Canada’s amendment procedures);
Albert, supra note 10, 247–51 (describing constitutional values implicit in Canada’s amendment rules).
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values.165 Article V, in contrast, contains only one narrow subject-matter
trigger: equal suffrage in the Senate.166
The second relevant feature of Article V is its exacting requirements for
amendment.167 It appears that the drafters of Article V believed that its procedures struck an appropriate balance between constitutional stability and
flexibility.168 Madison famously declared that Article V was “stamped with
every mark of propriety” because “[i]t guards equally against that extreme
facility, which would render the Constitution too mutable; and that extreme
difficulty, which might perpetuate its discovered faults.”169 The debates in
Philadelphia also suggest that the drafters intended Article V to provide a
more accessible amendment process than existed in the Articles of Confederation, which were universally agreed to be too hard to amend.170
Despite the Founders’ intentions, the contemporary reality is that Article V makes amendment of the federal Constitution nearly impossible.171
Between 1789 and 2004, there have been over 11,000 amendments introduced in Congress, and only thirty-three have been approved by Congress.172
165. See supra Section II.A; see also Albert, supra note 106, at 960–64 (describing how
amendment rules can express constitutional values).
166. See U.S. Const. art. V; Albert, supra note 106, at 947–48.
167. See Lutz, supra note 9, at 170 (creating an index of amendment difficulty for the
world’s constitutions and finding that the U.S. Constitution is the most difficult to amend);
Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism Revisited, 81 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1641, 1675 (2014) (finding that the U.S. Constitution is one of the least frequently revised in the world).
168. See Bernstein, supra note 125, at 14–31 (recounting Article V’s history and noting
that it was intended to be more flexible than the Articles of Confederation, but rigid enough to
provide stability and constancy).
169. The Federalist No. 43, at 284 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
170. To be sure, some in the Founding Era believed that the Federal Constitution should
be more mutable. Thomas Jefferson was the most outspoken proponent of procedures that
would make the federal Constitution more responsive to the living generation. See Zachary
Elkins et al., The Endurance of National Constitutions 12–33 (2009) (describing the
famous debate between Jefferson and Madison regarding constitutional flexibility); Kenneth
P. Miller, Direct Democracy and the Courts 157 (2009) (same). Madison’s vision nevertheless prevailed at the federal level. See Bernstein, supra note 125, at 15 (finding that the
goal of Article V was to make the Constitution easier to amend than the Articles of Confederation, but hard enough that it could only be used when the polity had reached consensus).
171. See Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution: Where the Constitution Goes Wrong (and How We the People Can Correct It) 160 (2006) (stating that
Article V “works to make practically impossible needed changes in our polity”); id. at 165
(“Article V constitutes an iron cage with regard to changing some of the most important
aspects of our political system.”); Albert, supra note 159, at 1042 (“Constructive unamendability is [a] . . . unique design feature of Article V.”). This is in part because of the inclusion
of so many new states since the founding; an occurrence that the founders may not have fully
appreciated. By increasing the overall number of states, the ratification process under Article V
has become more difficult. See generally Dixon & Holden, supra note 7, at 195–96 (discussing
how the size of a decisionmaking body can increase the difficulty of reaching agreement).
172. Miller, supra note 170, at 157; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Constancy: Why
Congress Should Cure Itself of Amendment Fever, 17 Cardozo L. Rev. 691, 692 (1996) (providing data regarding proposed and approved amendments).
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Of those thirty-three, only twenty-seven have been ratified by the states.173
Moreover, amendments are becoming less frequent and less substantively
significant over time.174 Indeed, meaningful formal amendment under Article V is now perceived to be so unlikely that some have concluded that Article V is “irrelevant”175 and perhaps even “desuetude.”176 As explained below,
courts have reasoned from the difficulty of amendment under Article V
when deciding certain constitutional disputes.177
B. Article V and Institutional Arguments Regarding Judicial Review
Supreme Court justices have explicitly relied on Article V to build several institutional arguments regarding the appropriate scope of judicial review. This Section catalogues and evaluates the Court’s arguments related to
Article V and judicial review in order to begin systematizing the Court’s
existing practice of using amendment rules in constitutional interpretation.
1. The Inference of Judicial Restraint
The most common amendment-based argument from Article V in Supreme Court opinions relates to judicial restraint. At various points in time,
justices arguing for judicial restraint in constitutional issues have relied on
Article V.178 The core of the argument is that the mere possibility of formal

173. See Harry L. Witte, Rights, Revolution, and the Paradox of Constitutionalism: The
Processes of Constitutional Change in Pennsylvania, 3 Widener J. Pub. L. 383, 396 (1993). Even
this number is somewhat misleading, because several of the amendments were adopted in
groups. Id. The Bill of Rights, for example, added ten amendments to the Constitution in
essentially one amendment event. Id. Likewise, the Reconstruction Amendments added three
more amendments at once. Id. It is more accurate, therefore, to think of the Constitution as
having been amended on sixteen different occasions. Id.
174. Albert, supra note 159, at 1045–46 (explaining that the frequency of content of Article V amendments has changed and become insignificant).
175. David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 Harv. L. Rev.
1457, 1458–60 (2001).
176. See Albert, supra note 159, at 1031–32 (introducing an argument that Article V may
be at risk of amendment by desuetude).
177. See infra Section III.B.3.
178. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 793–94 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Why the people are not up to the task of deciding what new rights to protect, even
though it is they who are authorized to make changes, see U.S. Const., Art. V, is never explained.”); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 75 (1970) (Black, J., concurring); Ullmann v.
United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956) (“Nothing new can be put into the Constitution except
through the amendatory process. Nothing old can be taken out without the same process.”);
Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 617 (1900) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“If some of the guarantees
of life, liberty and property which at the time of the adoption of the National Constitution
were regarded as fundamental and as absolutely essential to the enjoyment of freedom, have in
the judgment of some ceased to be of practical value, it is for the people of the United States so
to declare by an amendment of that instrument.”); see also Miller v. Civil City of South Bend,
904 F.2d 1081, 1132 (7th Cir. 1990) (Manion, J., dissenting).
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amendment through Article V implies that the Court should avoid introducing constitutional changes through judicial interpretation.179 Because Article
V provides explicit procedures for changing the constitutional text, constitutional change should occur through those procedures, and not through
transformative judicial rulings that effectively amend the Constitution without following Article V’s procedures.180 In other words, the mere existence of
procedures for formal amendment suggests an institutional preference for
how, at least some constitutional changes should be made, and—consequently—it also suggests implicit limitations on the scope of judicial
review.181
Members of the Court have developed this argument in varying degrees
of complexity. Justices who favor an originalist or textualist approach often
tack Article V onto dissenting or concurring opinions that characterize the
majority as effectively amending the Constitution by “judicial mutilation” of
the text.182 Those uses of Article V often fail to address some of the significant issues raised by this argument, such as whether Article V should be
understood as the only legitimate means of constitutional change, and
179. This argument is made most frequently by justices espousing a textualist or originalist approach to constitutional interpretation. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 8, at
81–90; Monaghan, supra note 30, at 126; see also Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures:
Discovering the Constitution, 93 Yale L.J. 1013, 1066–70 (1984) (explaining that the historical
belief that the Constitution could be changed only by formal amendment began to unravel
starting in the 1860s); Harry Pratt Judson, The Essentials of a Written Constitution, in IV The
Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago 311, 330 (1903); Michael W. McConnell, Time, Institutions, and Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. Rev. 1745, 1747 (2015) (explaining
how constitutional theories of interpretation have changed over time).
180. See, for example, McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 36 (1892), where the court stated:
Still less can we recognize the doctrine, that because the Constitution has been found in
the march of time sufficiently comprehensive to be applicable to conditions not within
the minds of its framers, and not arising in their time, it may, therefore, be wrenched
from the subjects expressly embraced within it, and amended by judicial decision without
action by the designated organs in the mode by which alone amendments can be made.

181. For theoretical commentary on this point, see Harris, supra note 8, at 165–68 (explaining implications of the formal amendment for judicial review).
182. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2628 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 793–94 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The subjective nature of Justice Stevens’ standard is also apparent from his claim that it is the courts’ prerogative—indeed their
duty—to update the Due Process Clause so that it encompasses new freedoms the Framers
were too narrow-minded to imagine. Courts, he proclaims, must ‘do justice to [the Clause’s]
urgent call and its open texture’ by exercising the ‘interpretive discretion the latter embodies.’
(Why the people are not up to the task of deciding what new rights to protect, even though it is
they who are authorized to make changes, see U.S. Const., Art. V, is never explained.)” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)); Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 75 (Black, J., concurring) (“Such
constitutional adjudication . . . amounts in every case to little more than judicial mutilation of
our written Constitution. . . . Until [the] language is changed by the constitutionally prescribed method of amendment, I cannot agree [with] this Court . . . .”); see also Causeway
Med. Suite v. Ieyoub, 109 F.3d 1096, 1115–16 (5th Cir. 1997) (Garza, J., concurring) (discussing the relationship between the “power to amend the Constitution” and the judiciary’s role in
developing substantive due process protections).
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whether a judicial ruling is sufficiently “transformative” to encroach on Article V.183
In Oregon v. Mitchell, however, Justice Harlan gave a particularly astute
formulation of the argument that Article V calls for judicial restraint.184
Mitchell involved a constitutional challenge by several states to Congress’s
authority to set voting requirements.185 The States argued that Congress
lacked authority to set state voting requirements.186 The government relied
principally on Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment as the basis for
Congress’s authority to regulate state voting requirements.187 After an extensive review of the history surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment,188 Justice Harlan concluded first that Section Five was clearly
not intended to deprive the States of their authority to set voting requirements, and, consequently, that such a change in constitutional structure
could be made only by amendment through Article V.189 Justice Harlan
explained:
It must be recognized, of course, that the amending process is not the only
way in which constitutional understanding alters with time. The judiciary
has long been entrusted with the task of applying the Constitution in
changing circumstances, and as conditions change the Constitution in a
sense changes as well. But when the Court gives the language of the Constitution an unforeseen application, it does so, whether explicitly or implicitly, in the name of some underlying purpose of the Framers. This is
necessarily so; the federal judiciary, which by express constitutional provision is appointed for life, and therefore cannot be held responsible by the
electorate, has no inherent general authority to establish the norms for the
rest of society. It is limited to elaboration and application of the precepts
ordained in the Constitution by the political representatives of the people.
When the Court disregards the express intent and understanding of the
183. Justice Scalia has also emphasized that formal amendment and judicial review are not
the only ways to limit legislative action. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2628 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
According to Justice Scalia, the “People” can “creat[e] additional liberties” through the “neverending process of legislation.” Id. Although Justice Scalia emphasized that changes to individual rights need not be constitutional, he nevertheless seemed to maintain that the existence of
Article V means that significant constitutional changes to individual rights should be achieved
through formal amendment rather than judicial review. See id. (stating that explicit changes in
individual rights should occur through formal constitutional amendment or “the never-ending process of legislation”).
184. 400 U.S. 112, 201–03 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
185. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 117–18 (Black, J., announcing the judgment of the Court). Pursuant to the Voting Rights Act, Congress had imposed various voting requirements on the
states. Id. The 1970 amendments to the Voting Rights Act set the voting age at eighteen for all
elections, abolished literacy and similar requirements for five years, and barred state residency
requirements in presidential elections. Id.
186. Id. at 117.
187. See id. at 117–19.
188. See id. at 152–55 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
189. See id. at 201, 209.

246

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 115:215

Framers, it has invaded the realm of the political process to which the amending power was committed, and it has violated the constitutional structure
which it is its highest duty to protect.190

Justice Harlan’s position hints at a nuanced theory regarding the relationship between Article V and the Court’s role. According to Justice Harlan,
Article V does not categorically prevent the judiciary from adapting constitutional norms to changed circumstances.191 The Court must, however, have
some evidence that the Framers intended the Court to assume this role.192
The Framers’ intent need not be explicit. It may, for example, be implied
from the choice of broad, conceptual language that necessarily requires judicial interpretation and adaptation.193 But Justice Harlan believed that constitutional changes clearly at odds with the Framers’ intent must occur through
Article V. According to Justice Harlan, if the Court makes changes that conflict with the Framers’ intentions, it has assumed a role that was to be exercised only through the amendment procedures enumerated in Article V.194
Justice Harlan’s articulation of this argument does not solve many of its
difficulties. For one thing, it assumes the functionality of Article V. As many
scholars have noted, Article V’s procedures for amendment are themselves
outdated and ill-suited to contemporary political circumstances.195 Indeed, it
is now practically impossible to amend the Constitution. Thus, it seems disingenuous to suggest that any significant amount of constitutional change
should occur through Article V.196 In reality, there are pressures for constitutional change that Article V seems unable to address.197 Additionally, it is
unclear why Article V should be understood as the exclusive means for
190. Id. at 202–03 (emphasis added).
191. Id. at 202; see also McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 33–35 (making a similar
observation).
192. In this respect, Justice Harlan’s position is inevitably tied to an originalist theory of
some variety.
193. This may have been what Harlan was referring to when he referenced the Framers’
“underlying purpose.” Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 202–03 (endorsing the idea that the court can
“give[ ] the language of the Constitution an unforeseen application” so long as that application
is “explicitly or implicitly, in the name of some underlying purpose of the Framers”); see also
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 174–76 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (criticizing a purely
historical interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment).
194. See Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 203; see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S.
779, 837–38 (1995) (hinting at an alternative theory of Article V’s exclusive jurisdiction;
namely, that “important changes in the electoral process” should occur “through the amendment procedures set forth in Article V”).
195. See Levinson, supra note 171, at 160–61 (arguing that Article V is outdated); supra
notes 167–177 and accompanying text.
196. But see Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14 n.27 (1957) (plurality opinion) (“It may be said
that it is difficult to amend the Constitution. . . . But if the necessity for alteration becomes
pressing, or if the public demand becomes strong enough, the Constitution can and has been
promptly amended.”).
197. See Levinson, supra note 171, at 160–61.
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changing any constitutional issues.198 Article V was clearly intended to provide for flexibility and ordered constitutional evolution, but there is a dearth
of historical evidence suggesting that Article V was intended to be the only
method of constitutional change for all or even some issues.199 In any event,
like Justice Harlan, other justices have relied on perceptions about the
proper function of Article V within the constitutional structure to build arguments for judicial restraint, and these arguments seem to follow a classic
structural logic.
2. The Inference of Judicial Power to Oversee Congress
and the President
In several opinions, justices have also constructed institutional arguments from Article V to support judicial review of federal legislation and
executive action.200 This argument is a corollary of the argument for judicial
restraint. That is, if Article V implies that at least some changes should occur
exclusively through formal amendment, then attempts by Congress or the
president to change the Constitution outside of Article V are illegitimate and
should be invalidated by the Court.201
In Reid v. Covert, for example, the Court considered the scope of the
treaty power, which is exercised jointly by the executive and the Senate.202
Pursuant to treaties with Great Britain and Japan, two civilian American
citizens were tried abroad before a court martial for crimes they committed
outside the United States.203 The trials complied with the treaties, but did
198. See generally Albert, supra note 159, at 1030–32 (explaining that this perception was
common early in American history, but it has given way to a recognition that constitutional
change occurs informally as well as through formal amendment).
199. But see Bernstein, supra note 125, at 29 (discussing some historical evidence that
Article V was intended only for structural changes and not fundamental normative changes).
200. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 449 (1998) (“If there is to be a
new procedure in which the President will play a different role in determining the final text of
what may ‘become a law,’ such change must come not by legislation but through the amendment procedures set forth in Article V of the Constitution.”); Reid, 354 U.S. at 17 (plurality
opinion) (“In effect, such construction would permit [presidential] amendment of that document in a manner not sanctioned by Article V.”). In ruling that Congress did not have power
to enact provisions of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Justice Kennedy wrote for the
Court: “Shifting legislative majorities could change the Constitution and effectively circumvent
the difficult and detailed amendment process contained in Article V.” City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997).
201. Obviously, this argument hinges on the holding in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is.”). Thus, although related to the argument from Article V regarding
judicial restraint, the effect of this argument is, in some sense, the opposite, because it serves to
legitimize judicial invalidation of congressional and presidential acts. Indeed, Justice Harlan
argued that judicial review is implicit in the constitutional structure and that Article V provides strong support for judicial review of actions taken by Congress and the president. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 204–05 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
202. 354 U.S. 1 (plurality opinion).
203. Reid, 354 U.S. at 3–5.

248

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 115:215

not comply with basic protections enshrined in the Bill of Rights.204 The
government argued that the trials were lawful because the Supremacy Clause
states that treaties “shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”205 The Court
rejected this argument, in part, because it would effectively permit the president and the Senate to amend the Constitution outside of Article V. The
Court stated:
It would be manifestly contrary to the objectives of those who created the
Constitution, as well as those who were responsible for the Bill of Rights—
let alone alien to our entire constitutional history and tradition—to construe [the Supremacy Clause] as permitting the United States to exercise
power under an international agreement without observing constitutional
prohibitions. In effect, such construction would permit amendment of that
document in a manner not sanctioned by Article V. The prohibitions of
the Constitution were designed to apply to all branches of the National
Government and they cannot be nullified by the Executive or by the Executive and the Senate combined.206

Justice Harlan made an even stronger argument from Article V in support of judicial review. In Oregon v. Mitchell, after discussing Article V’s
implicit limitations on the judiciary, Justice Harlan emphasized that Article
V also restrains Congress.207 More importantly, Justice Harlan argued that,
because Congress is designed to be democratically responsive, it is particularly important that the Court, which is insulated from the electorate, monitor Congress’s constitutional compliance.208 In support of this vision of
judicial review, Justice Harlan relied on the structure of Article V’s amendment procedures. According to Justice Harlan, Article V’s supermajority and
state-ratification requirements prove that ordinary “political restraints” are
insufficient to control Congress when constitutional issues are at play.209
Thus, in various contexts, the Court has built structural arguments from
204. See id. at 15–17.
205. See id. at 15–16 (quoting U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2).
206. See id. at 17 (footnote omitted).
207. See 400 U.S. 112, 204 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“As the Court is not justified in substituting its own views of wise policy for the commands of
the Constitution, still less is it justified in allowing Congress to disregard those commands as
the Court understands them.”).
208. See Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 204–05. In Mitchell, Justice Harlan stated:
The reason for this goes beyond Marshall’s assertion that: “It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” It inheres in the structure of
the constitutional system itself. Congress is subject to none of the institutional restraints
imposed on judicial decisionmaking; it is controlled only by the political process.

Id. (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 177 (1803)).
209. See id. at 205 (referencing Article V’s amendment rules and concluding: “To allow a
simple majority of Congress to have final say on matters of constitutional interpretation is
therefore fundamentally out of keeping with the constitutional structure”).
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Article V to support its review of the constitutionality of congressional and
presidential action.210
3. The Practical Need for Informal Judicial “Amendment”
On various occasions, the Court has suggested that its role in deciding
constitutional cases is affected by the practical difficulty of formal amendment to the Constitution through Article V. This has occurred most prominently in the Court’s doctrine of stare decisis, where the Court has clearly
articulated an institutional argument rooted in the practical difficulty associated with amending the Constitution through Article V. This Section first
discusses the concept of informal amendment through judicial review and
then explores the logic of the Court’s arguments from Article V in the context of stare decisis.
Many scholars have argued that the difficulty of amending the Constitution through Article V has effectively rerouted constitutional change to other
institutions, including judicial review by the Supreme Court.211 Although
there are many subtle variations to this argument, the basic logic is rather
straightforward.212 Changing circumstances and evolving social norms make
regular constitutional change necessary.213 Because Article V is “too cumbersome and erratic to serve as the sole vehicle for constitutional development
210. The Court has also referenced Article V as a basis for reviewing the constitutionality
of state action. In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995), the Court invalidated an amendment to the Arkansas Constitution that set congressional terms limits. See id.
at 837–38. In reaching this conclusion, the Court held that the Arkansas amendment was
effectively an impermissible attempt by an “individual State” to amend the Federal Constitution outside of the “amendment procedures set forth in Article V.” Id.; see also infra notes
262–265 and accompanying text (discussing Thornton).
211. For an early expression of this idea, see Paul J. Scheips, The Significance and Adoption
of Article V of the Constitution, 26 Notre Dame L. Rev. 46, 66 (1950). See also Ackerman,
supra note 179, at 1065–70, which discusses informal amendment. Of course, there are other
theories that may explain the trajectory of judicial review by the court. See generally Stephen
Gardbaum, Separation of Powers and the Growth of Judicial Review in Established Democracies
(or Why Has the Model of Legislative Supremacy Mostly Been Withdrawn From Sale?), 62 Am. J.
Comp. L. 613 (2014) (explaining various historical and political reasons for the expansion of
judicial review in foreign countries with similar governmental structures as in the United
States, unrelated to the difficulty of formal amendment).
212. See Lutz, supra note 9, at 153–63 (stating the logic of the argument and testing it
empirically).
213. Id. at 153–54 (“Every political system needs to be modified over time as a result of
some combination of [factors].”). Madison believed that procedures for amendment of the
federal Constitution were necessary because “useful alterations will be suggested by experience.” See The Federalist, supra note 169, at 284–85; accord Elkins et al., supra note 170, at
81–83 (writing that amendment procedures “allow[ ] the constitution to adjust to the emergence of new social and political forces”); Vile, supra note 156, at 79 (“It is wise, therefore, in
every government, and especially in a republic, to provide means for altering, and improving
the fabric of government, as time and experience, or the new phases of human affairs, may
render proper . . . .” (quoting 2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the
United States 599 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 5th ed. 1994))).
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in a complex and rapidly changing society,”214 political actors find alternatives for effectuating necessary constitutional change. These “informal”
methods of constitutional change are complex and push constitutional
change “off the books.”215 Informal amendment can occur, therefore, when
the Court issues a “transformative” ruling that “self-consciously repudiate[s]
preexisting doctrinal premises and announce[s] new principles that redefine
the American people’s constitutional identity,”216 and other branches effectively ratify that ruling “through acquiesce or approval.”217
These theories of “informal amendment” probe at the relationship between Article V and the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution in both
descriptive and normative ways. Descriptively, they attempt to explain why
the Court has sometimes engaged in “creative” interpretation of the constitutional text.218 Normatively, they suggest that the difficulty of formal
amendment justifies these “creative” interpretations because necessary constitutional change could not otherwise occur, and there are benefits to informal amendment processes.219
What is striking about these scholarly theories is that the Court has been
very reluctant to acknowledge them. That is, despite rulings that have effectuated significant changes in constitutional norms, the Court has generally
not relied on the difficulty of formal amendment to justify its own “transformative” rulings.220 Whatever influence the ability (or inability) to amend
through Article V had on these rulings, it is below the surface of the Court’s
opinions. In fact, the tone of the Court’s stated justifications is to show
continuity with past constitutional norms, not transformation.221 Thus,
214. Albert, supra note 159, at 1052 (quoting W. Lawrence Church, History and the Constitutional Role of Courts, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 1071, 1078).
215. See Stephen M. Griffin, The Nominee Is . . . Article V, 12 Const. Comment. 171, 172
(1995). As Richard Albert has noted, “[n]o single branch of government can make an informal
amendment on its own; other branches or institutions must either participate directly or acquiesce.” Albert, supra note 159, at 1053.
216. Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1164, 1173
(1988).
217. Albert, supra note 159, at 1053.
218. E.g., Strauss, supra note 175, at 1458–59, 1462–64 (arguing that Article V cannot
accommodate needed changes, which explains informal amendment). See generally Lutz,
supra note 9, at 157 (demonstrating empirically that “[t]he more important the role of the
judiciary in constitutional revision, the less likely the judiciary is to use theories of strict
construction”).
219. See, e.g., Gerken, supra note 9, at 928 (“[T]here are many things we might like about
the process of informal constitutional amendment—including the fact that it helps ensure the
ongoing contestability of constitutional law . . . .”).
220. Consider some of the most “transformative” rulings from the Court, such as Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), supplemented by 349 U.S. 294 (1955), and Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Nowhere in these transformative opinions does the court suggest
that Article V’s dysfunction justifies its rulings.
221. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 157–58 (arguing from history, practice, and precedent that
the word “person” as used in the Fourteenth Amendment does not include the “unborn”);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–86 (1965) (arguing that the right to contraception
is grounded in other recognized constitutional provisions and precedents).
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although these rulings might, in fact, be examples of meaningful informal
amendment, they are not examples of explicit amendment-based arguments.
There is one exception, however: the Court has explicitly cited the difficulty of formal amendment through Article V to justify overruling its own
constitutional precedents more freely than its own statutory precedents.222
Indeed, the Court has explicitly developed the doctrine of stare decisis in
constitutional cases around its belief that Article V makes the Constitution
extraordinarily difficult to amend.223 This argument was famously set out by
Justice Brandeis in his dissent in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas:
Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled
right. This is commonly true even where the error is a matter of serious
concern, provided correction can be had by legislation. But in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is
practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions.
The Court bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function. . . . In cases
involving the Federal Constitution the position of this Court is unlike that
of the highest court of England, where the policy of stare decisis was formulated and is strictly applied to all classes of cases. Parliament is free to correct any judicial error; and the remedy may be promptly invoked.224

Justice Brandeis’s primary concern seems to be correction of judicial
error through constitutional amendment. However, in a subsequent opinion, Justice Douglas hinted at the need for judicial updating of constitutional
norms as another rationale for flexibility in applying stare decisis.225 Taken
together, the logic of this amendment-based argument is clear: the Court
must be willing to overturn its own constitutional rulings when it becomes
evident that those rulings are in error or have become outdated because Article V makes it “practically impossible” for constitutional rulings to be corrected or updated through formal amendment.226
222. See Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to
the Rehnquist Court, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 647, 704–05 (1999) (describing this doctrine in detail).
223. See id. at 703–04 (identifying this logic as one of two justifications the court has
given for its constitutional stare decisis jurisprudence).
224. 285 U.S. 393, 406–10 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted); see also Lee, supra note 222, at 718–30 (discussing earlier articulations of this
rationale).
225. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 590–91 (1946) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
In his dissent, Justice Douglas stated:
[T]hroughout the history of the Court stare decisis has had only a limited application in
the field of constitutional law. And it is a wise policy which largely restricts it to those
areas of the law where correction can be had by legislation. Otherwise the Constitution
loses the flexibility necessary if it is to serve the needs of successive generations.

Id.
226. See Lee, supra note 222, at 727–30.
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The Court has explicitly followed this reasoning in subsequent cases
overruling constitutional precedents.227 In Agostini v. Felton,228 for example,
the Court overruled its prior decisions in Aguilar v. Felton229 and School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball,230 which, together, held that the establishment
clause “prohibited federal funding of a program providing remedial education to sectarian schools on a neutral basis with other schools.”231 In overruling those prior constitutional decisions, Justice O’Connor stated that
stare decisis “is at its weakest when we interpret the Constitution because
our interpretation can be altered only by constitutional amendment or by
overruling our prior decisions.”232
Thus, the Court’s doctrine of constitutional stare decisis provides another example of amendment creep. The Court has firmly embedded Article
V’s stringent amendment requirements and record of use to craft a doctrine
that is responsive to the realities of the constitutional structure.
C. Article V and Freedom of Expression and Association
In a few cases, the Court has relied on Article V to demonstrate that the
Constitution as a whole is not inimical to views that would support changing or even revolutionizing government.233 As the argument goes, because
Article V does not place any limitations on the substance of changes to the
227. See id. (finding that “despite its questionable historical pedigree, Brandeis’ approach
has been unquestionably adopted by the modern Court,” and collecting examples).
228. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
229. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
230. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
231. Lee, supra note 222, at 730 (describing Agostini).
232. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 235.
233. I found two Supreme Court cases explicitly adopting this logic and several lower
court cases. See Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 57 (1967) (interpreting the First Amendment
by reference to Article V); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 136–39 (1943) (drawing on Article V and the First Amendment to interpret an immigration statute in a manner
consistent with the Constitution); see also Frankfeld v. United States, 198 F.2d 679, 685–86
(4th Cir. 1952) (following the logic of the Second Circuit in United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d
201 (2d Cir. 1950), in applying the First Amendment and Article V); United States v. Dennis,
183 F.2d 201, 206 (2d Cir. 1950) (“If the defendants had in fact so confined their teaching and
advocacy, the First Amendment would indubitably protect them, for it protects all utterances,
individual or concerted, seeking constitutional changes, however revolutionary, by the
processes which the Constitution provides. Any amendment to the Constitution passed in
conformity with Article V is as valid as though it had been originally incorporated in it; the
only exception being that no state shall be denied ‘its equal Suffrage in the Senate.’), aff’d, 341
U.S. 494 (1951); Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 299 F. Supp.
117, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (“Since those who authored Rule 9406 were quite as aware as we are
that the First Amendment lies at the very heart of our ‘form of government,’ we should not
lightly suppose they had any idea that applicants should be refused admission to the bar for
exercising their constitutionally guaranteed rights to freedom of speech, peaceable assembly
and petition for redress of grievances. Since they were likewise entirely aware that the Constitution contains Article V, providing for amendment, we will similarly not suppose they intended admission to be refused to applicants who advocate amendment, even very radical
amendment, by lawful means.”). For general academic commentary on this issue, see Jeff
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Constitution, Article V supports the notion that the Constitution protects
contrarian views about government. Justice Douglas stated the argument
this way:
If the Federal Constitution is our guide, a person who might wish to “alter”
our form of government may not be cast into the outer darkness. For the
Constitution prescribes the method of “alteration” by the amending process in Article V; and . . . there is no restraint on the kind of amendment
that may be offered.234

Schneiderman v. United States provides a particularly clear example of
the Court drawing on Article V to interpret the First Amendment.235 In
Schneiderman, the government sought to revoke the petitioner’s certificate
of citizenship based on an allegedly illegal procurement of his naturalization.236 The naturalization statute in force at the time required the petitioner
to demonstrate that he had resided continuously within the United States for
five years and, during that time, had “behaved as a man of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States”237
The government claimed that the petitioner illegally procured his certificate
of citizenship because he did not disclose to the naturalization court that he
was an active member of the Workers (Communist) Party of America and
the Young Workers (Communist) League of America.238 The government asserted that those groups espoused “sweeping changes in the Constitution,”
and, therefore, the petitioner could not demonstrate that he was in fact “attached” to the Constitution.239
In addressing the government’s claim that the petitioner had rejected
the Constitution, the Court acknowledged that the petitioner had, in fact,
espoused views that were “distasteful to most” Americans and “call[ed] for
considerable change in our present form of government and society.”240
However, the Court concluded that the petitioner could, nevertheless,
demonstrate a commitment to the Constitution, because:
The constitutional fathers, fresh from a revolution, did not forge a political
strait-jacket for the generations to come. Instead they wrote Article V and
the First Amendment . . . . Article V contains procedural provisions for
constitutional change by amendment without any present limitation whatsoever except that no State may be deprived of equal representation in the
Senate without its consent. This provision and the many important and
far-reaching changes made in the Constitution since 1787 refute the idea
Rosen, Note, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?, 100 Yale L.J. 1073, 1084–86
(1991) (discussing implicit limitations on amendment through Article V).
234. Whitehill, 389 U.S. at 57.
235. Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 136–39.
236. Id. at 120–21.
237. Id. at 133 (quoting Act of June 29, 1906, § 4 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 382 (2012))).
238. Id. at 121–22.
239. Id. at 135.
240. Id. at 136.
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that attachment to any particular provision or provisions is essential, or
that one who advocates radical changes is necessarily not attached to the
Constitution.241

This argument illustrates some of the substance that plausibly may be
implied from Article V. Specifically, Article V implies robust First Amendment protection of political speech. To be sure, there are limits to the substance that courts can infer from Article V. As noted above, Article V is
relatively generic when compared to state amendment rules and other national constitutions around the world.242 But these cases nevertheless illustrate the power and possibilities of structural arguments from amendment
rules.243
D. Article V and Federalism
Perhaps the most obvious institutional argument emanating from Article V relates to federalism.244 Article V deeply entrenches equal representation in the Senate for all states regardless of population size.245 It also
requires all amendments to be ratified by three-fourths of the states, and it
permits the states to bypass Congress and call a convention to propose
amendments.246 These provisions clearly suggest that federalism is an integral aspect of the constitutional structure.247
On its face, the equal-suffrage trigger suggests a strong preference for
maintaining decentralization. By providing each state with equal representation in the Senate, the Constitution aims to ensure that national policies will
not overrun state authority.248 And the Senate operates as a veto chamber for
241. Id. at 137 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). The Court continued:
As Justice Holmes said, “Surely it cannot show lack of attachment to the principles of the
Constitution that . . . [one] thinks it can be improved.” Criticism of, and the sincerity of
desires to improve, the Constitution should not be judged by conformity to prevailing
thought because, “if there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively
calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought—not free thought
for those who agree with us, but freedom for the thought that we hate.

Id. at 138 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
242. See supra Section III.A.
243. See generally Albert, supra note 28, at 31 (arguing that free speech protections are
effectively unamendable through Article V because free speech is inseparable from representative democracy); Rosen, supra note 233, at 1084–86 (discussing literature suggesting that Article V contains an implicit prohibition on changes to free speech).
244. See Levinson, supra note 118, at 122 (discussing federalism values as inherent and
obvious in Article V’s structure).
245. See U.S. Const. art. V.
246. Id.
247. See Albert, supra note 10, at 228–29 (explaining that Article V demonstrates that
“federalism is an historically important constitutional value in the United States”).
248. See Monaghan, supra note 30, at 143–46 (discussing the federalism considerations
that were central to Article V’s design); see also Vile, supra note 156, at 38–39 (describing
federalism’s role in the design of Article V).
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subnational interests.249 By making suffrage in the Senate constructively impossible to amend,250 Article V suggests that federalism is an important constitutional value.251
The history behind Article V and the equal-suffrage requirement confirms the connection between Article V and federalism.252 Equal suffrage in
the Senate, and its insulation from amendment in Article V, were crucial
issues in obtaining the Constitution’s ratification.253 The states were protective of their individual sovereignty and skeptical of creating a national government with the ability to consolidate power at the center.254 This was
especially true for the Southern slave states, which feared a federal government that would establish a national prohibition on slavery.255 Article V’s
equal-suffrage “trigger” was therefore intended to ensure that future representatives could not use the amendment power to alter this vertical power
arrangement between the states and the federal government.256
Surprisingly, despite Article V’s expression of federalism principles,
judges have only occasionally relied on Article V when deciding federalism
disputes.257 The infrequent use of Article V to help resolve federalism disputes may be explained in part by the fact that the Constitution contains
many other provisions clearly reinforcing its federal structure.258 In any
event, on a few occasions, the Supreme Court has explicitly relied on Article
V to support its resolution of federalism disputes.
249. See Baker, supra note 29, at 946–58 (describing the theoretical and actual role of the
Senate in making federal policy and the connection to Article V amendment processes).
250. See Albert, supra note 159, at 1044 (explaining that the equal suffrage clause is constructively unamendable).
251. See Bernstein, supra note 125, at 28 (explaining the significance of federalism based
on Article V and evidence from the Federalist Papers). The equal suffrage clause is not the only
evidence of federalism’s priority in the constitutional structure. Article V is also relatively
unique, in that it allows the states to bypass Congress and amend the Constitution by calling a
convention. See Marshfield, supra note 107, at 985–86 (explaining the significance of this process from a federalism standpoint).
252. See generally Bernstein, supra note 125, at 14–22 (describing this history generally).
253. See 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 201–03 (Max Farrand
ed., 1911) (quoting Connecticut delegate Roger Sherman as saying that “[t]he smaller States
would never agree to the plan on any other principle [than an equality of suffrage in this
branch]” (second alteration in original)).
254. See Monaghan, supra note 30, at 145.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. The two prominent examples from the Supreme Court are Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898, 919 (1997) (referencing Article V as a basis for protecting state officials from
commandeering by the federal government), and City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529
(1997) (ruling that Congress encroached on state authority when enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in part because Article V implies some limits on congressional power).
258. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 919 (explaining that the federal system of dual sovereignty is
“reflected throughout the Constitution’s text” and listing “only a few examples,” including
Article V).
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In Printz v. United States, various state and local officials challenged provisions of the federal Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that required
them to conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers
and provide related information to federal authorities.259 The officials argued that it was unconstitutional for the federal government to compel state
and local officials into federal service.260 The Court agreed and, in support of
its ruling, cited Article V as evidence that the states retain “a residuary and
inviolable sovereignty” that prevents the federal government from enlisting
state officials.261
The Court has also invoked Article V to invalidate state actions that
intrude on federal power. In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, the Court
considered the constitutionality of an amendment to the Arkansas Constitution that placed term limits on Arkansas’s congressional representatives.262
The Court held that the amendment was unconstitutional because it violated the Qualifications Clauses of the federal Constitution263 and impermissibly assumed powers that the Constitution reserved to the federal
government.264 In reaching this conclusion, the Court explained that “allowing the several States to adopt term limits for congressional service
would effect a fundamental change in the constitutional framework,” and
that Article V implies that “[a]ny such change must come not by legislation

259. Id. at 902.
260. Id. at 905.
261. Id. at 918–19 (quoting The Federalist, supra note 169, No. 39 (James Madison)).
City of Boerne provides a subtler use of Article V to resolve a federalism dispute. 521 U.S. at
529. That case involved a challenge to Congress’s authority under the Fourteenth Amendment
to enact the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512. In answering
that question, the court considered whether the Fourteenth Amendment authorized Congress
to expand against the states the substantive rights contained in Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, or whether the Fourteenth Amendment simply authorizes Congress to enact
remedial legislation without expanding substantive rights. Id. at 527. The court concluded that
the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes only remedial legislation, because the alternative conclusion would effectively remove any limits on congressional power over the states, which
would “effectively circumvent the difficult and detailed amendment process contained in Article V.” Id. at 529. It should be noted that City of Boerne could also be viewed as another
example of how the court has used Article V to justify judicial review of congressional action.
See supra Section III.B.2.
262. 514 U.S. 779, 783–84 (1995). Amendment 73 to the Arkansas Constitution was
adopted in November 1992, and it stated:
The people of Arkansas find and declare that elected officials who remain in office too
long become preoccupied with reelection and ignore their duties as representatives of the
people. Entrenched incumbency has reduced voter participation and has led to an electoral system that is less free, less competitive, and less representative than the system established by the Founding Fathers. Therefore, the people of Arkansas, exercising their
reserved powers, herein limit the terms of elected officials.

Thorton, 514 U.S. at 783–84 (quoting Ark. Const. amend. LXXIII, pmbl.).
263. Id. at 782–83 (citing U.S. Const. art I, § 2, cl. 2; 3, cl. 3).
264. Id. at 836–37.
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adopted . . . by an individual state, but rather . . . through the amendment
procedures set forth in Article V.”265
Although courts have infrequently relied on Article V to resolve federalism disputes, these cases nevertheless illustrate how Article V can inform
structural analysis.266
IV. Amendment Creep in State Constitutional Interpretation
Article V is relatively generic when compared to amendment rules in
state constitutions. It is common for state amendment rules to contain alternative processes for amendment and even multiple subject-matter limitations or triggers regarding amendment. Consequently, state constitutional
amendment rules provide a much more intricate, but promising, source of
amendment-based structural arguments. In this Part, I provide a general
summary of state amendment rules. Then, I systemize state amendment
creep by providing a typology of recognized and potential amendmentbased arguments from state amendment rules.
A. State Constitutional Amendment Processes
Amendment rules in state constitutions are very different from their
federal counterpart in structure and frequency of use.267 There is great variety in how state amendment rules are structured.268 In general, however,
state constitutions can be amended by one or more of the following
processes: “(1) voter adoption of legislatively-referred proposals, (2) voter
adoption of citizen-initiated proposals, (3) voter adoption of commissionreferred proposals, or (4) through constitutional conventions.”269
Moreover, state amendment rules often include many procedural requirements that hint at the respective constitution’s political process priorities. Delaware, for example, does not allow for amendment by citizen
initiative, nor does it require amendments to be ratified by popular referenda.270 Instead, amendments can be made by a two-thirds vote of the state
265. Id. at 837.
266. See Vile, supra note 156, at 158–67 (discussing failed attempts to argue that Article V
includes implicit limitations on any changes to state power without unanimous state consent);
Selden Bacon, How the Tenth Amendment Affected the Fifth Article of the Constitution, 16 Va. L.
Rev. 771, 776–77 (1930) (same).
267. See generally Tarr, supra note 147, at 23–27 (explaining the distinctive nature of
state constitutional amendment).
268. Tarr & Williams, supra note 31, at 1077–1102 (describing state amendment rules and
emphasizing many nuances and great variety).
269. Teresa Stanton Collett, Judicial Independence and Accountability in an Age of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments, 41 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 327, 334–35 (2010) (footnotes
omitted).
270. Del. Const. art. XVI, § 1 (“Any amendment or amendments to this Constitution
may be proposed in the Senate or House of Representatives . . . and if . . . such proposed
amendment or amendments shall upon yeah and nay vote be agreed to by two thirds of all the
members elected to each House, the same shall thereupon become part of the Constitution.”).
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legislature in two successive legislative sessions.271 And, as mentioned above,
New Mexico requires constitutional amendments to be published in
Spanish.272
State amendment rules are also characterized by a variety of subjectmatter triggers.273 In Massachusetts, for example, the public may propose
amendments through the initiative process on any issue except “excluded
matters.”274 Excluded matters include, among other things, any “measure
that relates to religion, religious practices or religious institutions,” “recall or
compensation of judges,” and various rights provisions contained in the
Massachusetts Bill of Rights.275 Similarly, the Mississippi Constitution lists
four issues that cannot be addressed in an amendment by public initiative:
(1) changes to the Bill of Rights; (2) any amendment relating to the “Mississippi Public Employees’ Retirement System;” (3) the right to unionize; and
(4) changes to the provision limiting the use of the public initiative.276 The
Illinois Constitution requires all amendments to be proposed by the legislature and then ratified by a public referendum.277 The only exception is for
amendments related to the “structural and procedural subjects” of the legislature, which can be proposed by public initiative.278
In addition to subject-matter triggers, state constitutions also have a tradition of declaring certain provisions unamendable.279 The Alabama Constitution, for example, states that “[r]epresentation in the legislature shall be
based upon population, and such basis of representation shall not be
271. Id.
272. N.M. Const. art. XIX, § 1.
273. See Cody Hoesly, Comment, Reforming Direct Democracy: Lessons from Oregon, 93
Calif. L. Rev. 1191, 1236 (2005) (surveying subject-matter restrictions).
274. Mass. Const. amend. art. XLVIII, pt. 2.
275. Id. amend. art. XLVIII, pt. 2, § 2; see also Conlin, supra note 32, at 1091–92 (explaining the scope of the excluded matters under Article XLVIII).
276. Miss. Const. art. XV § 273(5).
277. Ill. Const. art. XIV, § 2(a).
278. Id. art. XIV, § 3. Based on my review of amendment rules in all fifty states, there are
at least eight states that contain subject-matter triggers of some kind in their amendment
rules. These subject-matter triggers can be systematized into five general patterns: (1) the constitution generally allows for amendments through citizen initiative, but identifies specific subjects that may not be amended by initiative (Massachusetts, Mass. Const. amend. art. XLVIII,
pt. 2; Mississippi, Miss. Const. art. XV §273(5)); (2) the constitution generally requires
amendments through legislative proposal and public referendum, but it identifies certain subjects that may be amended by initiative (Illinois, Ill. Const. art. XIV); (3) the constitution
requires all amendments to be proposed by the legislature and ratified by public referendum,
but it requires higher majorities for amendments addressing certain subjects (New Mexico,
N.M. Const. art. XIX, § 1); (4) the constitution requires compliance with additional procedural requirements for amendments addressing certain subjects (Louisiana, La. Const. art. XIII,
§ 1); and (5) the constitution authorizes amendments affecting only certain local jurisdictions,
but it requires majorities from the affected local jurisdictions to approve those amendments
(Alabama, Ala. Const. amend. 555; Louisiana, La. Const. art. XIII, § 1(C)).
279. See Yaniv Roznai, Unamendability and the Genetic Code of the Constitution, 27 European Rev. Pub. L. 775 (2015).
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changed by constitutional amendments.”280 The California Constitution
provides that “[n]o amendment to the Constitution . . . that names any
individual to hold any office, or names or identifies any private corporation
to perform any function or to have any power or duty, may be submitted to
the electors or have any effect.”281 Several states also single out specific individual rights as “inviolate,”282 but it is unclear where this language makes
those provisions unamendable.283
Additionally, state constitutional amendment rules often include a distinction between the procedures for amendment and the procedures for
constitutional revision.284 Amendment generally refers to ad hoc changes to
the existing constitutional text that do not “substantially alter the substance
and integrity of the state Constitution as a document of independent force
and effect.”285 Revision, on the other hand, generally refers to substantial
quantitative or qualitative “changes in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan.”286 The distinction between amendment and revision is significant
because amendment rules generally require constitutional revision to occur
through the more arduous process of a constitutional convention.287 Moreover, the distinction between revision and amendment has resulted in a body
of law that ranks constitutional priorities to determine which provisions (or
collection of provisions) affect a constitution’s core, and which are more
peripheral.288
280. Ala. Const. art. XVII, § 284. But see Tarr & Williams, supra note 31, at 1119 (explaining that the provision was originally intended to only temporarily make the clause
unamendable).
281. Cal. Const. art. II, § 12.
282. E.g., Fla. Const. art. I, § 22 (“The right of trial by jury shall be secure to all and
remain inviolate.”); Kan. Const. Bill of Rights, § 11 (“The liberty of the press shall be inviolate . . . .”); N.M. Const. art. II, § 5 (“The rights, privileges and immunities, civil, political and
religious guaranteed to the people of New Mexico by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo shall be
preserved inviolate.”); cf. N.C. Const. art. I, §6 (“The legislative, executive and supreme judicial powers of the State government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other.”).
283. See, e.g., Op. of the Justices, 81 So. 2d 881, 883–84 (Ala. 1955) (holding that inviolate
provisions in the Alabama Constitution were amendable).
284. See Gerald Benjamin, Constitutional Amendment and Revision, in 3 State Constitutions for the Twenty-First Century: The Agenda of State Constitutional Reform
177–78 (G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams eds., 2006) (noting that twenty-three states have
amendment-revision distinctions). See generally Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll, Malleable
Constitutions: Reflections on State Constitutional Reform, 87 Tex. L. Rev. 1517, 1521–24 (2009).
285. See Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1087 (Cal. 1990) (in bank).
286. See Legislature v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309, 1316 (Cal. 1991) (in bank) (quoting Amador
Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal.3d 208, 223 (1978)).
287. See Benjamin, supra note 284, at 178; see also Tarr & Williams, supra note 31, at
1081–82 (surveying these requirements); Michael G. Colantuono, Comment, The Revision of
American State Constitutions: Legislative Power, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Change,
75 Calif. L. Rev. 1473, 1478 (1987) (discussing a “non-revision requirement,” which some
courts invoke to limit the substance of constitutional amendment proposals).
288. See, e.g., State v. Manley, 441 So. 2d 864, 873–74 (Ala. 1983); Bess v. Ulmer, 985 P.2d
979, 988–89 (Alaska 1999) (holding that reapportioning legislative districts, even though that
power was specifically assigned to the executive, was not a revision); Strauss v. Horton, 207
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Finally, state constitutions are characterized by frequent amendment.289
The states have adopted 7,481 amendments to their current constitutions,
and voters have considered and rejected an additional 3,888 amendments.290
Although amendment rates vary, even the Vermont Constitution, which is
amended the least frequently, is amended, on average, at least once every
four years.291 As one commentator observed, state constitutional amendment is a “beehive” of political activity,292 and another commentator has
described state constitutional law as characterized by “amendomania.”293
Significantly, it is rather common for state constitutional amendments to
respond to state court constitutional rulings.294 Thus, as compared to Article
V, state constitutional amendment processes are significantly more accessible and responsive to popular constitutional preferences.295
It is important to emphasize that amendment rules and practices vary
greatly from state to state and are often influenced by jurisdiction-specific
factors. As others have noted, “no catalogue of the mechanisms for state
constitutional change can fully capture the richness or the variety of the
approaches that have been used.”296 For present purposes, it is sufficient to
highlight that state constitutional amendment rules contain substance that
can inform the meaning of other constitutional provisions.
P.3d 48, 90–110 (Cal. 2009) (holding that changes to the meaning of “equal protection” under
the state constitution was an amendment, and not a revision), abrogated by Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Eu, 816 P.2d at 1316–20 (holding that an amendment setting
a budget limitation was not a revision); People v. Frierson, 599 P.2d 587, 613–14 (Cal. 1979)
(determining that an amendment reinstating the death penalty was not a revision), sub nom
Frierson v. Calderon, 968 F. Supp. 497 (C.D. Cal. 2004), rev’d in part sub nom Frierson v.
Woodford, 463 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2006); McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787, 799 (Cal. 1948);
Op. of the Justices, 264 A.2d 342, 344–46 (Del. 1970); Adams v. Gunter, 238 So. 2d 824,
830–32 (Fla. 1970) (opining that an amendment to create a unicameral legislature is a revision); Rivera-Cruz v. Gray, 104 So. 2d 501, 502–05 (Fla. 1958); Martinez v. Kulongoski, 185
P.3d 498, 502–05 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) (finding that a marriage amendment was not a revision
under the Oregon Constitution).
289. See John Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2014, in 47 Council of State
Governments, The Book of the States 3, 11–12 tbl.1.1 (2015) (listing the number of
amendments for all extant state constitutions); Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 167, at 1669–77
(quantifying the amendment rates for state constitutions).
290. Dinan, supra note 289, 11–12 tbl.1.1.
291. See id. This is a simple average. Vermont adopted its current constitution in 1793 and
has amended it fifty-four times, which equates to an annual amendment rate of 0.244. See id.
292. See John Kincaid, State Constitutions in the Federal System, Annals Am. Acad. Pol.
& Soc. Sci., Mar. 1988, at 14.
293. See Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., First Things Last: Amendomania and State Bills of Rights, 54
Miss. L.J. 223, 233 (1984).
294. See John Dinan, State Constitutional Amendments and Individual Rights in the
Twenty-First Century, 76 Alb. L. Rev. 2105, 2113–18 (2013) (discussing amendments overturning court rulings).
295. See id.
296. Tarr & Williams, supra note 31, at 1077.
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B. State Amendment and Institutional Arguments Regarding
Judicial Review
1. Frequent State Amendment and an Inference of Judicial Restraint
Like the Supreme Court, state courts have also made amendment-based
arguments in support of judicial restraint.297 Those arguments often follow a
logic similar to the arguments articulated by members of the Supreme
Court. That is, because a state constitution contains procedures for formal
amendment, judges should avoid rulings that effectively amend the constitution outside the procedures for formal amendment. The core of this argument is that including procedures for formal amendment in state
constitutions implies that state courts should defer to democratic processes
for at least some constitutional changes.
Several state judges and courts have added extra “punch” to the argument for judicial restraint by highlighting that state constitutions are
amended easily.298 Because the amendment of the Constitution is “practically impossible,” the Supreme Court is the only institution at the federal
level with a realistic opportunity to update and revise constitutional
norms.299 State courts, on the other hand, exist alongside an amendment
power that is truly accessible to the citizenry. Thus, some state court opinions have discussed that it is particularly appropriate for state judges to exercise restraint in adopting “transformative” constitutional rulings because
constitutional change can genuinely occur through formal amendment.300
297. See, e.g., Kansas ex rel. Apt v. Mitchell, 399 P.2d 556, 559 (Kan. 1965) (holding that
“[t]his court has no power to engraft amendments to our state constitution” and citing the
provision for amendment as support for limited judicial authority); Minnesota v. Hamm, 423
N.W.2d 379, 381 (Minn. 1988) (enforcing the constitution’s literal terms “[a]bsent a constitutional amendment”), superseded by constitutional amendment, Minn. Const. art. I, § 4;
Cooper v. Poston, 483 S.E.2d 750, 751 (S.C. 1997) (holding that “the legislature cannot abrogate the constitutional right to a jury trial by simply designating a civil action as non-jury
[because] [a]mendments to the S.C. Constitution may be made only after approval by the
electorate” and citing to amendment rules as support for limited judicial role); Medlock v.
1985 Ford F-150 Pick Up, 417 S.E.2d 85, 87 n.3 (S.C. 1992) (“The General Assembly possesses
the authority to propose a constitutional amendment which, if adopted by the electorate,
would abolish the right to a jury trial in forfeiture proceedings. S.C. Const. art. XVI, § 1.”).
298. This argument has been adopted in some variety in the following states: Kansas,
Minnesota, and South Carolina. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 297.
299. See supra Section III.B.3 (discussing this logic in the Supreme Court’s stare decisis
jurisprudence).
300. See, e.g., Sherman v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 744 S.E.2d 26, 32–33 (Ga. 2013) (“The
same process [of amendment] has been followed in this State on numerous occasions; it is
indeed an essential aspect of our republican form of government, in which the people, not the
judges, have ultimate control over the law under which they live.”); Hill v. State, 659 So. 2d
547, 554 (Miss. 1995) (Lee, J., dissenting) (opinion denying rehearing) (“If the people of Mississippi wish to provide convicted capital murderers with such a constitutional right, then the
citizens of this State, and not this Court, should amend our constitution through the democratic process as has been done on many occasions.”); McFarland v. Barron, 164 N.W.2d 607,
615 (S.D. 1969) (Biegelmeier, P.J., dissenting) (“Reasons for liberal and broad interpretations
of the national constitution are not persuasive as to our state constitution. The people have
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Arguments for judicial restraint rooted in ease of amendment seem to
be based on an inference about institutional design. Because a constitution
contains flexible amendment rules that the people use regularly, courts
should interpret the constitution as expressing an institutional preference for
constitutional change to occur through the amendment power rather than
informal judicial decisionmaking.301 Although the history of amendment design in some states supports this conclusion,302 the argument has obvious
limits. For one thing, ease of amendment alone does not require the inference that other forms of constitutional change are discouraged. A constitution could aim to facilitate both formal and informal constitutional change
by creating opportunities for judicial and popular constitutional outputs.303
Indeed, some state judges have expressly rejected the notion that the ease of
formal amendment should affect how judges understand their role when
interpreting a constitutional provision.304
Additionally, the argument for judicial restraint based on ease of
amendment raises an interesting problem regarding variable entrenchment
in state constitutional amendment rules. As noted above, some states have
amendment rules that single out certain substantive issues as unamendable305 or more difficult to amend.306 Constitutions that contain elevated
amended it . . . when they deemed it necessary or desirable . . . . These actions confirm the
observations made in the constitutional convention debates . . . that our constitution was easily
amended.” (emphasis added)); Ex parte Lewis, 219 S.W.3d 335, 375 n.14 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007) (Cochran, J., concurring) (“If a state’s citizens perceive the need for expanded constitutional protection beyond that found in the federal constitution, they—the citizens—can
amend their constitution to provide those protections.”).
301. As noted above, several states seem to have made their amendment rules more flexible for exactly this reason. See sources cited supra note 148.
302. See supra note 148 (explaining that amendment rules in Kentucky and various other
states were designed with this institutional preference in mind).
303. See Gerken, supra note 9, at 934–43 (explaining the design rationales for favoring
informal amendment).
304. For example, in Commonwealth v. O’Neal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered the constitutionality of the death penalty under the Massachusetts Constitution. See 339 N.E.2d 676, 677 (Mass. 1975). A key issue dividing the court was whether it was
appropriate for the justices to consider the possibility that the citizens of Massachusetts may
overturn the court’s ruling by amending the constitution. See O’Neal, 339 N.E.2d at 691–93
(Tauro, C.J., concurring). At the time, 61 percent of Massachusetts voters had recently indicated their support for the death penalty, and the Massachusetts Constitution could be
amended by a public initiative approved by a simple majority of voters. See Mass. Const. art.
XLVII; O’Neal, 339 N.E.2d at 708 n.1 (Reardon, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Tauro rejected the
notion that it was appropriate for judges to consider the possibility of responsive amendments.
See id. at 691–93 (Tauro, C.J., concurring). According to Chief Justice Tauro, judges must
“interpret the Constitution to the best of [their] personal abilities and judgment,” regardless of
possible amendments. Id. at 692.
305. See, e.g., Ala. Const. art. XVIII, § 284 (“Representation in the Legislature shall be
based upon population, and such basis of representation shall not be changed by constitutional amendments.”).
306. See Tarr & Williams, supra note 31, at 1119 (“Other states require a distinctive mode
of constitutional change for a particular issue.”).
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protections for specific subject areas create the possibility that some substantive issues carry less (or no) potential for amendment, which could suggest
the opposite institutional inference (i.e., greater judicial authority to interpret and adapt the provision).307 In other words, if a particular provision is
singled out as more difficult to amend, that may suggest an institutional
preference for change on that issue to occur through judicial decisionmaking
rather than through popular amendment.308 Thus, to the extent state judges
explicitly acknowledge ease of amendment in their interpretative methodology, they may need to account for variable entrenchment of constitutional
provisions.
In any event, this amendment-based argument is a frequent refrain in
state constitutional jurisprudence. Interestingly, although this argument for
judicial restraint has been very unsuccessful at the Supreme Court regarding
Article V, it seems to be very powerful before state high courts. Whereas the
argument almost always appears in dissents in Supreme Court opinions, it is
frequently used by majorities in state court opinions to justify their rejection
of “transformative” constitutional arguments.
2. Frequent State Amendment as a Basis of Judicial Activism
As scholars and at least one state court judge have recognized, ease of
amendment can “cut[ ] both ways” regarding the judicial role.309 Several
scholars have suggested that, because state constitutions are easy to amend,
state judges should be more willing than federal judges to break new constitutional ground.310 These scholars suggest that, because state constitutional
rulings are easy to “correct” or modify by constitutional amendment, state
307. See Albert, supra note 10, at 264–80 (explaining how this has occurred in Germany
regarding an unamendable provision).
308. See Schwartzberg, supra note 140, at 184 (“[W]hen constitutional provisions are
made unamendable and constitutional courts have final authority over the interpretation of
such provisions, entrenchment does not actually inhibit alterations,” but rather “shifts the
locus of change—and the power to determine the legitimate scope of mutability—away from
legislatures and toward the court”).
309. Ex parte Lewis, 219 S.W.3d 335, 374 n.14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (Cochran, J., concurring) (citing various scholars advocating for state judicial activism because of ease of
amendment and commenting that “[t]his argument, however, cuts both ways”).
310. Howard, supra note 151, at 939–40; Conor O’Mahony, If a Constitution is Easy to
Amend, Can Judges Be Less Restrained? Rights, Social Change, and Proposition 8, 27 Harv. Hum.
Rts. J. 191, 241–42 (2014); Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in
the Federal Courts, 87 Calif. L. Rev. 1409, 1453 (1999) (“[T]heir greater accountability might
render state judges more willing to read state constitutional guarantees expansively.”); Lawrence Schlam, State Constitutional Amending, Independent Interpretation, and Political Culture:
A Case Study in Constitutional Stagnation, 43 DePaul L. Rev. 269, 288–89 (1994); see also
Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S. Cal. L. Rev. 323, 358
(2011) (“It is possible that the political accountability of state judges (and the amendability of
state constitutions) might encourage them to read state constitutions more expansively, knowing that their rulings can always be ‘corrected’ by a democratic majority.” (emphasis
omitted)).
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judges should feel less constrained in deciding constitutional issues.311 This
is especially true, as the argument goes, for rulings that would expand constitutional rights because any counter-majoritarian problem created by a
court ruling can easily be “corrected” by constitutional amendment, which
is not the case at the federal level.312
Despite scholarly enthusiasm for arguments that rely on ease of amendment to support judicial activism, courts have been reluctant to explicitly
rely on amendability in this way. Although various courts have referenced
ease of amendment in arguing for judicial restraint, I was able to identify
only one opinion where a state judge explicitly relied on ease of amendment
to build an argument for an expansive constitutional ruling.313
In Commonwealth v. O’Neal, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
ruled that executing a prisoner convicted of rape and murder violated the
state constitution’s prohibition on cruel and usual punishment.314 In support of that ruling, Justice Hennessey relied on indicia of contemporary perceptions regarding the use of capital punishment and concluded that the
people of Massachusetts disapproved of the death penalty.315 He then added:
[I]f the present will of the people of the Commonwealth is that capital
punishment should be permitted in some or all cases of murder in the first
degree, procedures for amendment of the State Constitution which are relatively speedy, but still require time for reasonable reflection, are available to
accomplish that end.316

The gist of this argument seems to be that court’s ruling was justified even if
the court was wrong because the people have a realistic opportunity to correct the court’s ruling through amendment.317
311. E.g., O’Mahony, supra note 310, at 242.
312. Id. at 241–42.
313. Commonwealth v. O’Neal, 339 N.E.2d 676, 694 (Mass. 1975) (Hennessey, J.,
concurring).
314. Id. at 677.
315. Id. at 694. Specifically, Justice Hennessey argued:
Between 1947 and 1972 . . . no person was executed in this Commonwealth. During that
same period I take notice that the death sentences of twenty-five persons were commuted
or reduced by executive action. During this time span seven different Governors served.
There is the best of reasons to believe that the Constitution of the Commonwealth, a
viable document, does not now permit capital punishment in rape-murder cases.

Id.
316. Id. (emphasis added).
317. This argument is interesting because it seems to acknowledge possible error on the
court’s behalf. The court’s logic seems to be as follows: although we might be wrong regarding
the people’s constitutional preferences, we are justified in erring on the side of overprotecting
minority interests, because the majority has a real opportunity to respond through constitutional amendment. Incidentally, the people of Massachusetts amended the constitution in
1982 to read, “No provision of the Constitution . . . shall be construed as prohibiting the
imposition of the punishment of death.” See Alan Rogers, “Success—At Long Last”: The Abolition of the Death Penalty in Massachusetts, 1928–1984, 22 B.C. Third World L.J. 281, 352–53
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Courts’ limited reliance on ease of amendment to support judicial activism does not mean that ease of amendment has not impacted state court
decisions. In fact, citizens frequently adopt constitutional amendments in
response to state court rulings,318 and there is evidence that state judges are
affected by the politicization of state constitutional issues.319 Despite these
practical realities, however, for better or worse, this argument is not yet well
recognized in existing state constitutional jurisprudence.
C.

State Amendment Rules and Substantive Constitutional Priorities

At first glance, state constitutional amendment rules would seem to provide more fertile ground for amendment-based arguments than the federal
Constitution. Several states have constitutional amendment rules that establish some kind of subject-matter limitation on amendments. These subjectmatter limitations can suggest substantive values that might inform judicial
interpretation of other constitutional provisions. Surprisingly, however, few
state courts have drawn substantive inferences from constitutional amendment rules. This Section analyzes the few opinions that have explicitly used
amendment rules in this way and explores various substantive arguments
suggested by state constitutional amendment rules that judges and litigants
might utilize in the future.
1. Variable Amendment and State Constitutional Priorities
There are eight states that organize their amendment rules around subject-matter “triggers.”320 These subject-matter triggers can suggest a “hierarchy of constitutional values” that might inform judicial resolution of other
constitutional disputes.321 As Richard Albert has observed, “escalating tiers
of formal entrenchment may signal constitutional designers’ intent to match
the level of formal amendment difficulty to the significance of the role the
designated [constitutional] provision occupies.”322 Thus, if a court is faced
with competing constitutional values, it might benefit from the “hierarchy”
of constitutional values expressed in the constitution’s formal amendment
rules.
New Mexico’s amendment rules provide the clearest example of a hierarchy of constitutional values captured in amendment rules.323 In general,
(2002) (quoting Mass. Const., art. 26 (amended 1982)); see also Commonwealth v. ColonCruz, 470 N.E.2d 116, 117 (Mass. 1984) (holding the death penalty unconstitutional).
318. See Kenneth P. Miller, Defining Rights in the States: Judicial Activism and Popular
Response, 76 Alb. L. Rev. 2061, 2063–64 (2013) (explaining citizens’ reactions to state court
decisionmaking).
319. See Miller, supra note 170, at 214–15 (discussing anecdotal evidence from state
judges about the impact of politics on judicial decisionmaking).
320. See supra note 278.
321. See supra Section II.A.
322. Albert, supra note 10, at 250.
323. See N.M. Const. art. XIX, § 1.
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amendments to the New Mexico Constitution must be approved by a majority of both houses in the legislature and a majority of the electors voting on
the amendment in a general election.324 However, amendments affecting education and the rights of Spanish-speaking residents must be approved by
three-quarters of the legislature and the electorate.325 These higher thresholds suggest a deep commitment to retaining stable constitutional protection
regarding those issues.
Consider how New Mexico’s amendment-rule triggers that deeply entrench education policy and the rights of Spanish-speakers might be relevant
to a state judge or litigant in New Mexico considering competing constitutional norms. In State v. Samora, the New Mexico Supreme Court considered whether a trial court constitutionally dismissed a juror who could not
understand English.326 The trial court reasoned that dismissing the juror was
not a substantial error.327 In overruling the trial court’s decision, the Supreme Court noted that the New Mexico Constitution provides that the
right to serve on a jury “shall never be restricted, abridged or impaired on
account of . . . inability to speak, read or write the English or Spanish languages.”328 The court emphasized that “[t]his unique right” is “enshrined in
our state Constitution as one of the few provisions that can be amended only
by a supermajority of both legislators and voters.”329 The court therefore concluded that state judges have an affirmative obligation to “make every reasonable effort” to accommodate language barriers, including the use of an
interpreter and even postponement for a reasonable time “if the continuance
will be effective in securing an interpreter.”330 Thus, the court relied on the
deep entrenchment of the protection for Spanish-speaking residents in
resolving the conflict between the criminal defendant’s right to a speedy trial
and the Spanish-speaking juror’s right to participate.
Although Samora is a powerful example of how courts can rely on
amendment-based arguments to resolve constitutional conflicts, constitutional priorities are not always clear from amendment rules. New Mexico’s
324. Id.; see also Chuck Smith, The New Mexico State Constitution 175–79 (2011)
(describing New Mexico’s amendment rules).
325. N.M. Const. art. XIX, § 1 (“No amendment shall restrict the rights created by Sections One and Three of Article VII hereof, on elective franchise, and Sections Eight and Ten of
Article XII hereof, on education, unless it be proposed by vote of three-fourths of the members
elected to each house and be ratified by a vote of the people of this state in an election at which
at least three-fourths of the electors voting on the amendment vote in favor of that amendment.”). The New Mexico Constitution also provides that these amendments must be approved by two-thirds of the voters in each county, but the New Mexico Supreme Court has
ruled that this requirement violates the equal protection clause. State ex rel. Witt v. State
Canvassing Bd., 437 P.2d 143, 144 (N.M. 1968) (holding that the requirement of approval by
two-thirds of the voters from each county was an equal protection violation).
326. 307 P.3d 328, 330 (N.M. 2013).
327. Samora, 307 P.3d at 330.
328. Id. at 331 (alteration in original) (quoting N.M. Const. art. VII, § 3).
329. Id. (emphasis added).
330. Id. at 332 (quoting State v. Rico, 52 P.3d 942, 946 (N.M. 2002)).
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amendment rules suggest a clear hierarchy of priorities because they impose
higher voting thresholds for certain subjects. But most subject-matter triggers in state constitutional amendment rules operate slightly differently. In
Mississippi and Massachusetts, for example, the amendment rules identify
certain subjects that may not be changed by public initiative, but they do not
impose higher voting thresholds or add additional decisionmakers to the
process.331 Conversely, the Illinois Constitution allows for only one issue
(modification of the legislative article) to be amended by public initiative,
but it does not impose any heightened voting requirements.332
Do these rules suggest a hierarchy of constitutional values? They may, if
one assumes that amendment by public initiative is categorically easier than
amendment by legislative proposal and referendum.333 However, these subject-matter triggers do not necessarily reflect a ranking of constitutional values. They may instead reflect a design choice regarding the best institution
to resolve certain issues. Excluding certain subjects from public initiatives
may reflect a preference for representative lawmaking on issues that might
especially benefit from deliberation.334 There is evidence that this was the
intent behind the Massachusetts subject-matter triggers for religious amendments and amendments relating to judicial independence.335 Conversely, allowing amendment on certain subjects by public initiative might reflect a
preference for direct democracy on those issues rather than a hierarchy of
values.336 There is evidence that this was the intent behind the Illinois

331. Mass. Const. art. XLVIII, § 2; Miss. Const. art. XV, § 273.
332. Ill. Const. art. XIV, § 2.
333. The empirical evidence on this issue is unclear. In some states, such as California, the
initiative seems much easier to use than the legislative referral method. A recent survey of
successful amendments between 2005 and 2015 in initiative states, however, found that just
over 91% of amendments in those states occurred through the legislative-referral method, and
only 7.5% occurred via the initiative, and less than 1% occurred through constitutional commissions. See Jonathan L. Marshfield, Improving Amendment, 69 Ark. L. Rev. 477, 448–49
(2016).
334. One can imagine, for example, that constitutional designers might see value in subjecting changes to a constitution’s bill of rights to the virtues of representative deliberation and
eliminating the risks posed by direct democracy. Financial matters might also benefit from
deliberation by representatives who have better access to all relevant information. See Jones v.
Bates, 127 F.3d 839, 859 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining the general benefits to representative
lawmaking).
335. Russell Patrick Plato, Note, Selective Entrenchment Against State Constitutional
Change: Subject Matter Restrictions and the Threat of Differential Amenability, 82 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1470, 1477 (2007).
336. Illinois rules are illustrative here, because they allow amendment by public initiative
only regarding the structure of the legislature. See Ill. Const. art. XIV, § 3. This choice seems
intended to facilitate representative accountability and counteract legislative self-interest. See
Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Reforming Redistricting: Why Popular Initiatives to Establish Redistricting Commissions Succeed or Fail, 23 J.L. & Pol. 331 (2007). Obviously, direct democracy
has benefits in reducing agency costs and promoting representative accountability.
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subject-matter trigger.337
This ambiguity in subject-matter triggers may explain why it is relatively
uncommon for state courts to infer a hierarchy of constitutional values from
amendment rules, even those with subject-matter triggers. Nevertheless, arguments related to subject-matter triggers remain viable and important
tools that judges and lawyers should utilize in ascertaining constitutional
meaning.
2. Unamendable Provisions and State Constitutional Values
Amendment rules can also suggest constitutional values by making certain provisions unamendable. Unamendable provisions can suggest constitutional values for the same reasons that variable amendability can suggest a
hierarchy of constitutional values: constitutional designers presumably wish
to make only the most important constitutional values unamendable.338
Thus, an unamendable provision may signal to a court that the provision is
an especially important constitutional value.
As noted above, unamendable provisions are uncommon in contemporary state constitutions.339 Nevertheless, there is a history of unamendability
in state constitutions. The 1669 Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina,
which John Locke drafted, famously declared that “these fundamental constitutions shall be and remain the sacred and unalterable form and rule of
government . . . forever.”340 The Delaware Constitution of 1776 also prohibited amendments “to the declaration of rights, the articles establishing the
[S]tate’s name, the bicameral legislature, the legislature’s power over its own
officers and members, the ban on slave importation, and the establishment
of any one religious sect.”341
Currently, only Alabama and California contain unamendable provisions.342 The Alabama Constitution states that “[r]epresentation in the
337. Stephanie Rae Williams, Note, Voter Initiatives in Illinois: Where Are We After Chicago
Bar Association v. State Board of Elections?, 22 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 1119, 1122–24 (1991) (quoting a convention delegate as saying that the provision was chosen to operate in areas where
direct democracy “would be most needed because of the vested interest of the legislature in its
own makeup”).
338. See supra Section II.B (discussing this and other explanations for unamendable
provisions).
339. See supra Sections IV.A, IV.B. They are more common in national constitutions
around the world. See Lutz, supra note 9, at 170 (showing the amendment difficulty of the
world’s constitutions); Albert, supra note 117, at 13 (“Over 50 percent of all new constitutions
[around the world] entrench a formally unamendable provision.”).
340. Levinson, supra note 140, at 4 (alteration in original) (quoting John Locke, The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, in 1 The Statutes at Large of South Carolina 43, 56
(Thomas Cooper ed., 1836)).
341. Roznai, supra note 279, at 785; see Del. Const. of 1776, arts. I, II, V, XXVI, XXIX,
XXX.
342. But see supra note 282 (listing several state constitutional provisions declaring certain
rights and principles to be “inviolate”). The “unamendable” provision of Alabama’s constitution, however, has been held by the Alabama Supreme Court to be “dominant,” but not
unamendable. Op. of the Justices, 81 So. 2d 881, 883–85 (Ala. 1955).
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Legislature shall be based upon population, and such basis of representation
shall not be changed by constitutional amendments.”343 The California Constitution provides that “[n]o amendment to the Constitution . . . that names
any individual to hold any office, or names or identifies any private corporation to perform any function or to have any power or duty, may be submitted to the electors or have any effect.”344
In Alabama, courts have referred to this portion of Alabama’s amendment rules as the “dominant provision of the Alabama Constitution on the
subject of representation in the Legislature,”345 and they have relied on it as
support for striking down legislation that would affect representation in the
legislature.346 Although no California case seems to have drawn any substantive inferences from the California provision, it remains a viable basis for
inferring state constitutional values, such as a strong distaste for nepotism
and a concern about the misuse of the public initiative.347
3. The Revision-Amendment Distinction and State
Constitutional Priorities
As described earlier, the distinction between revision and amendment in
state constitutional amendment rules has resulted in a body of case law addressing whether a proposed constitutional change “cuts to the core” of a
state constitution.348 This body of law provides insight into a state’s constitutional priorities. If a state considers a particular change to be so substantial
that it is a revision requiring a constitutional convention, this signals that
the subject at issue is likely a core constitutional value of great significance.
These core values may be relevant to courts resolving claims between competing constitutional norms.
A case from California illustrates how the revision-amendment distinction might give rise to a hierarchy of constitutional values relevant to constitutional adjudication. In Raven v. Deukmejian, the California Supreme
Court considered whether criminal procedure amendments to the state constitution were impermissible constitutional revisions.349 The amendments
343. Ala. Const. art. XVII, § 284.
344. Cal. Const. art. II, § 12.
345. Sims v. Frink, 208 F. Supp. 431, 438 (M.D. Ala. 1962) (per curiam). But see Op. of the
Justices, 81 So. 2d at 883–85 (holding that an unamendable provision was “dominant,” but,
nevertheless, finding it to be amendable).
346. See Frink, 208 F. Supp. at 437–38.
347. See Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 771 P.2d 1247, 1263 (Cal. 1989) (stating that the
provision was “enacted to prevent the initiative from being used to confer special privilege or
advantage on specific persons or organizations”).
348. This is particularly true for challenges to amendments based on their qualitative impact on the constitution rather than their quantitative impact. See Amador Valley Joint Union
High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281, 1284–89 (Cal. 1978) (“[E]ven a
relatively simple enactment may accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our
basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision . . . .”).
349. 801 P.2d 1077, 1079 (Cal. 1990).
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were designed to scale back the rights of criminal defendants and ensure that
the California Supreme Court did not grant constitutional rights to criminal
defendants beyond those required by the United States Constitution.350 Several of the amendments at issue made substantive changes to rules regarding, among other things, post-indictment preliminary hearings, joinder of
cases, and use of hearsay.351 A key amendment, however, also stated that
California courts could not construe the state constitution as granting criminal defendants greater rights than those afforded by analogous provisions of
the United States Constitution.352 The court held that this last change was an
impermissible constitutional revision because it “would vest all judicial interpretive power, as to fundamental criminal defense rights, in the United
States Supreme Court.”353 According to the court, this reallocation of judicial power was a substantial alteration to the “preexisting constitutional
scheme” because it “would substantially alter the substance and integrity of
the state Constitution as a document of independent force and effect.”354
Thus, although the court upheld the other changes as valid amendments, it
struck down the provision attempting to tether the California Constitution
to the United State Supreme Court’s rulings.355
Raven hints at a hierarchy of constitutional values in California that may
be relevant to judicial resolution of other disputes. Indeed, Raven seems to
turn on a deep commitment to state independence in California, especially
independence from the federal government.356 What transformed the
amendment in Raven into an impermissible revision was the fact that the
amendment effectively delegated authority to interpret the state constitution
to the federal government.357 According to the court, this sort of change

350. Raven, 801 P.2d at 1080. The preamble to the amendments provided: “[The people]
hereby find that the rights of crime victims are too often ignored by our courts and by our
State Legislature, that the death penalty is a deterrent to murder, and that comprehensive
reforms are needed in order to restore balance and fairness to our criminal justice system.” Id.
The amendments then contained a series of changes to the constitution’s text regarding a
variety of criminal procedure issues. See id. at 1080–82.
351. Id. at 1081; see also Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 93–94 (Cal. 2009) (discussing
Raven).
352. See Raven, 801 P.2d at 1086 (discussing Crime Victims Justice Reform Act, Initiative
Measure Prop. 115 (approved June 5, 1990) (codified at Cal. Const. art. I, §§ 14, 24, 29, 30),
declared unconstitutional by People v. Sanders, 797 P.2d 561, 589 (Cal. 1990)).
353. Id. at 1087.
354. Id. at 1087, 1089.
355. Id.; see also Bess v. Ulmer, 985 P.2d 979, 987–88 (Alaska 1999) (reaching the same
conclusion regarding a nearly identical attempted amendment to the Alaska Constitution).
356. Raven, 801 P.2d at 1088–89 (“It is one thing voluntarily to defer to high court decisions, but quite another to mandate the state courts’ blind obedience thereto, despite ‘independent state interests[ ]’ . . . that might lead [state] courts to construe similar state constitutional
language differently from the federal approach.”).
357. Id. at 1087.
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struck at the core of California’s Constitution and could be effectuated only
by a constitutional convention.358
California’s constitutional commitment to resist unnecessary federal encroachment could have applications in other contexts as well. For one thing,
it should embolden litigants to urge California judges to interpret the California Constitution, especially its rights provisions, in light of California’s
unique tradition, history, and values.359 In contrast to California’s commitment to independent constitutional review, some states have held that, when
the federal Constitution contains provisions analogous to a disputed state
constitutional provision, state judges should defer to any interpretations
given by the United States Supreme Court.360 This sort of lockstep interpretive methodology directly contradicts California’s commitment to state judicial independence. Indeed, Raven suggests that California judges have an
affirmative obligation to engage in independent interpretation of the California Constitution.361 Raven’s reliance on impermissible revision to support
independent judicial review presents a tool that litigants and judges should
utilize in approaching state constitutional issues in California.
4. Other Substantive Inferences
Finally, state constitutional amendment rules are eclectic in their structure and terms.362 This creates the possibility that they may provide a sound
basis for miscellaneous substantive arguments even without a clear hierarchy
of amendment difficulty. In New Mexico, for example, the state constitution
requires the secretary of state to publish all proposed amendments in both
English and Spanish.363 This requirement, which is unique among the states,
suggests that New Mexico values political inclusion of Spanish-speaking

358. Id. at 1085–86 (finding that a constitutional convention would be necessary, because
the measure amounted “to a constitutional revision beyond the scope of the initiative
process”).
359. See generally Justin Long, Intermittent State Constitutionalism, 34 Pepp. L. Rev. 41
(2006) (discussing various approaches to state constitutional interpretation).
360. See Tarr, supra note 147, at 180–82 (describing this approach to state constitutional
interpretation); Robert F. Williams, State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine:
Case-by-Case Adoptionism or Prospective Lockstepping?, 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1499, 1502–20
(2005) (describing state decisions lock-stepping state constitutional provisions to federal
standards).
361. Raven, 801 P.2d at 1087–89.
362. See generally Tarr, supra note 147, at 6–28 (discussing the differing state approaches
to constitutional amendment).
363. N.M. Const. art. XIX, § 1 (stating that the secretary of state “shall . . . provide notice
of the content and purpose of legislatively approved constitutional amendments in both English and Spanish to inform electors about the amendments in the time and manner provided
by law”).
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residents and recognizes that the government has an obligation, at some
level, to communicate with residents in both Spanish and English.364
This amendment-based argument may have application in other contexts, too. Consider, for example, Maso v. State Taxation and Revenue Department, Motor Vehicle Division.365 In that case, the defendant was cited for
driving under the influence of alcohol.366 At the time of his citation, the
officer served him with a “notice of revocation” in English stating that his
driving license would be revoked in twenty-one days if he did not submit a
written request for a hearing within ten days.367 The defendant could not
read or speak English, and he failed to timely submit the hearing request.368
When he finally obtained an attorney, the state denied his request for a
hearing as untimely.369 He then sued, claiming that the state violated the due
process clause under the New Mexico Constitution by serving him with the
notice only in English.370
Relying on precedent from various courts of appeals, the court found
that the federal Due Process Clause was satisfied with an English-only notification.371 The court noted, however, that the New Mexico Constitution can
provide broader protections if the party claiming those protections can
“provide reasons for interpreting the state provision differently from the
federal provision.”372 Because the defendant had not presented any reasons
in the trial court to support interpreting the New Mexico Constitution differently, the New Mexico Supreme Court denied his due process claim.373
The petitioner in Maso, however, may have satisfied his burden if he had
reviewed the amendment rules for New Mexico’s constitution.374 New Mexico’s amendment rules establish a strong policy in favor of Spanish notifications by the government. Indeed, not only do the amendment rules require
all proposed amendments to be published in Spanish and English, but they
also deeply entrench constitutional provisions requiring all public school
teachers to learn Spanish, and effectively require the government to provide
364. See State v. Samora, 307 P.3d 328, 331 (N.M. 2013) (finding that the protection of
non-English speakers’ rights “has been part of [New Mexico’s] judicial history since [its] territorial days”).
365. 96 P.3d 286 (N.M. 2004).
366. Maso, 96 P.3d at 287.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. See id. at 287–88.
370. See id. at 288–89. Although Maso did not raise a federal constitutional claim per se,
the Supreme Court of New Mexico typically addresses state constitutional claims under the
Federal Constitution, as well. See id. at 289 n.1.
371. Id. at 289–91.
372. Id. at 288.
373. Id. at 288–89.
374. This suggestion sets aside, for argument’s sake, the procedural bars facing the petitioner because he did not raise his state constitutional claim at the trial court. See id. at
288–89.
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interpreters for Spanish-speaking jurors.375 Obviously, the federal Constitution does not contain any of these protections for Spanish-speaking citizens.
Thus, the defendant in Maso could have constructed a strong (or, at the very
least, plausible) argument from New Mexico’s amendment rules for why the
court should interpret New Mexico’s due process clause to require notification in both English and Spanish.
V. A Brief Comment on the Normative Implications
of Amendment Creep
Despite the fact that some courts have relied on amendment rules to
interpret other constitutional provisions, one may question whether the use
of amendment rules to inform constitutional meaning is normatively desirable. Perhaps there is no good reason for judges and lawyers to venture into
amendment rules when looking for guidance regarding other constitutional
provisions. Perhaps the inherent indeterminacy offsets any marginal interpretive benefits that a judge or lawyer might gain from studying amendment
rules. One might also be concerned that the practice of using amendment
rules to inform constitutional interpretation could elevate certain constitutional values at the expense of other important priorities.376
It is not my purpose here to conduct a full normative defense of using
amendment rules to ascertain constitutional meaning. It is worth noting,
however, two important reasons why judges and lawyers should take amendment rules more seriously when engaging in structural analysis.
First, like most well-crafted structural arguments, amendment-based arguments can promote overall constitutional coherence by ensuring that provisions are not interpreted in isolation from other relevant provisions and
institutions. Constitutional coherence is a normatively desirable goal in and
of itself because it can promote determinacy and legitimacy in constitutional
meaning.377 As Michael Dorf has explained, holistic interpretation stems
from the normative “premise that the meaning of the constitutional text is
not exhausted by whatever concepts an isolated phrase connotes to the
reader; further guidance can often be gleaned from the balance of the constitutional text.”378 Holistic interpretation can, in turn, promote a constitution’s legitimacy by avoiding conflicting interpretations and internal
conflicts within a constitutional text.379
375. See N.M. Const. art. VII, § 3; id. art. XII, § 8; id. art. XIX, § 1.
376. Here, I have in mind the concern that amendment rules could blur the distinction
between popular lawmaking and the judicial role. For example, those who believe that the
judiciary should operate primarily as an objective mediator between the people and minorities
might find reliance on amendment rules to be normatively undesirable if amendment rules
elevate majoritarian processes for constitutional change.
377. See Jackson, supra note 2, at 1287.
378. Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 Va. L. Rev. 951, 953 (2002).
379. To be sure, constitutional coherence is “only one of several values that a constitution
as law should aspire to.” Jackson, supra note 2, at 1287. Constitutions also seek to “establish[ ]
justice” and “sustain[ ] democracy.” Id.
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Notwithstanding these virtues of a holistic approach to constitutional
meaning, judges and lawyers frequently overlook amendment rules when
engaging in structural analyses. Judges and lawyers seem to assume that
amendment rules are relevant only to lay out the technical procedures for
amendment. In fact, as demonstrated above, amendment rules provide a
rich source of constitutional information on a variety of subjects. Thus, for
the sake of broader constitutional coherence, using amendment rules to interpret a constitution holistically would seem to be normatively desirable.
Second, and more specifically, increased attention to amendment rules
can help ensure that democratic values receive appropriate consideration in
the interpretive process. Judges rarely consider the details of the amendment
power when marking out the boundaries of judicial review. Failure to consider the amendment process in evaluating judicial authority is problematic
because the amendment power is the only direct check on judicial review.
Amendment rules provide insight into how the people wish to remain involved in the evolution of constitutional law and, consequently, what role
the judiciary should play in the process of constitutional change. Amendment rules will sometimes fail to provide clarity regarding the scope of judicial authority in a particular case, but they are surely an important place to
look when considering the proper balance between judicial authority and
democratic lawmaking processes. Judicial rulings that effectuate significant
changes in constitutional meaning implicate the amendment power and the
people’s right to determine the meaning of their fundamental law. Amendment-based structural arguments are normatively desirable, therefore, because they protect popular sovereignty by ensuring that constitutional
changes occur through authorized institutions.
But there is another side to using amendment rules in the interpretive
process that can benefit courts. When faced with transformative constitutional cases, courts often worry about the “legitimacy” of their rulings. Their
concerns stem, in part, from the so-called “counter-majoritarian difficulty,”
where courts invalidate laws approved by a majority to protect affected minorities.380 Amendment rules are relevant to this concern. If one accepts that
the judiciary’s authority to render counter-majoritarian rulings stems in
part from a popular delegation of authority to the judiciary through the
constitution,381 then amendment rules become relevant to understanding the
terms of that delegation. Amendment rules can indicate how much control
over constitutional change the people wish to retain, and, consequently, how
much authority they wish to delegate to the judiciary. Thus, amendment
rules can provide courts with a concrete source of counter-majoritarian authority that is itself grounded in popular sovereignty principles.

380. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 16 (2d ed. 1986).
381. This is by no means a settled issue of constitutional theory. See generally Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial
Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 333 (1998) (tracing the historical popular and political responses to the counter-majoritarian difficulty).
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Consider, for example, the amendment rules for the Massachusetts
Constitution.382 In crafting those amendment rules, the people of Massachusetts identified certain “excluded matters” that may not be addressed
through popular initiative amendments.383 The “excluded matters” include
any “measure that relates to . . . the appointment, qualification, tenure, removal, recall or compensation of judges; or to the reversal of a judicial decision; or to the powers, creation or abolition of courts.”384 Those limitations
on formal amendment seem to indicate a deep commitment to judicial independence from popular, majoritarian politics.385 This is a distinctive commitment not shared by many states that, instead, have popularly elected
judges and liberal recall procedures.386 Thus, Massachusetts’s amendment
rules provide a concrete and specific foundation upon which courts might
anchor counter-majoritarian rulings. Anchoring judicial authority in specific constitutional provisions in this way would seem to be an improvement
on vague and idealized separation of powers platitudes because those provisions are more directly tied to an expression of popular sovereignty.387
Conclusion
Amendment rules do much more than provide the technical guidelines
for changing a constitution’s text. In fact, they can contain meaningful and
useful substance relevant to other constitutional issues. More often than not,
however, courts and lawyers overlook amendment rules when engaging in
structural, constitutional analysis.388 My aim in this Article is to draw attention to amendment rules as a source of constitutional meaning by sketching
some of the arguments that courts have already derived from amendment
382. See supra notes 274–275 and accompanying text (describing and discussing Massachusetts’s amendment rules).
383. Mass. Const. amend. 48, § 2.
384. Id.
385. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. O’Neal, 339 N.E.2d 676, 692 (Mass. 1975) (Tauro, C.J.,
concurring) (explaining that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts must remain independent of popular sentiment because, “[i]f we succumb to contemporary public opinion[,]
we lose that requisite independence and impartiality demanded of us and fail totally in our
purpose”).
386. See Tarr, supra note 147, at 70 (noting that “nine states select[ ] state supreme court
justices via partisan elections, thirteen in nonpartisan elections, and fifteen through a system
of merit selection in which justices run in retention elections after their initial appointment”);
id. at 4, 56–65 (discussing procedures in several states for the recall of state judges and specific
judicial decisions).
387. See O’Neal, 339 N.E.2d at 692 (arguing in very general and theoretical terms that
“[o]ppressed, disfavored or unpopular minorities would be the victims of any loss of judicial
independence,” and that “minorities rely on the independence of the courts to secure their
constitutional rights against incursions of the majority”).
388. Although I have identified various cases where courts have relied on amendment
rules to interpret other constitutional provisions, these cases admittedly remain the exception,
rather than the norm.
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rules and suggesting a few arguments that seem strongly supported by existing amendment provisions.389 Amendment-based reasoning will certainly
not solve many of the problems inherent in constitutional adjudication, but
broader recognition of amendment-based arguments would likely promote
constitutional coherence and legitimacy. My hope is that lawyers and judges
will pay greater attention to amendment rules and the structural inferences
that they support when they engage in constitutional adjudication.

389. This Article does not purport to present an exhaustive list of amendment-based arguments. There are surely other ways that amendment rules can shed light on constitutional
meaning. Further inquiry is necessary to fully understand the potential and limits of amendment-based constitutional argument.

